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Improbable Cause: A Case for
Judging Police by a More Majestic
Standard
Melanie D. Wilsont
INTRODUCTION
This article presents findings from an empirical study of trial
judges' rulings on allegations of police perjury over a twenty-four
month period in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas. The article then relies on these findings to argue that the
United States Supreme Court's current conception of the judge-made
exclusionary rule undermines the ideals the majority purports to
advance and ignores other values of a dependable justice system.
In 1926, Judge Benjamin Cardozo famously quipped about the
exclusionary rule -a criminal should not "go free because the
constable . . . blundered." 2 Recently, writing for a five-justice
majority3 in Herring v. United States, Chief Justice Roberts quoted

Cardozo's catchy phrase in holding that the exclusionary rule does not
bar evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as long
as the police are merely negligent in obtaining the evidence and their
negligence is "nonrecurring and attenuated." 4 The current Court
majority deems the exclusionary rule a judge-made tool designed
solely to deter police from infringing on a criminal defendant's

Associate Professor, the University of Kansas School of Law, mdwilson(hku.edu.
For thoughtful feedback on this project, I thank Christopher Slobogin and
participants of workshops at Atlanta's John Marshall Law School., the University of
North Carolina School of Law, the University of Oregon School of Law, Washburn
University School of Law, and William and Mary School of Law. Likewise, I thank
participants of the 2009 Central States Law Schools Association Annual Conference
and of the Southwest Junior Law Professors workshop for their insights. Finally, I
thank my able research assistants, Kendra Oakes and Melissa Plunkett.
1The exclusionary rule generally bars the prosecution from using evidence against a
defendant in a criminal case when the evidence was gathered in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
2 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). The case was
decided when Cardozo was a judge; later, he became Justice Cardozo.
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito formed this majority.
4 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009).
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constitutional rights. 5 Thus, at least five justices apply the rule only
when the likelihood of deterrence is appreciable and the benefits of
that deterrence outweigh the costs of excluding evidence.7 The
majority in Herringreasoned: "The principal cost of applying the rule
is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go
free," 8 something that "offends basic concepts of the criminal justice
system," including placing a "costly toll upon truth-seeking and law
enforcement objectives." 9
The Court's interpretation of the function of the exclusionary
rule was not always so limited. Historically, the exclusionary rule
served not only to deter unlawful police conduct but also to protect the
integrity of the judicial system. In fact, in Mapp v. Ohio, in which the
Court held that the rule applies to state law enforcement officers, as
well as federal agents, the Court expressly criticized Judge Cardozo's
opinion regarding the exclusionary rule, noting "another
consideration-the imperative of judicial integrity"-that merits
application of a rule that sometimes results in the release of a
"criminal.'" 0 The Court in Mapp reasoned: "The criminal goes free, if
he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws ...
,11

If the current Court majority is correct that the Fourth
Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence as its remedy
and that the exclusionary rule serves only to deter police misconduct in
cases in which the benefits and likelihood of deterrence outweigh the
harm of releasing a guilty person, then the Court's refusal to exclude
evidence in cases of simple police mistake or negligence follows.
Negligence is difficult to deter, and an innocent police mistake often
Id. at 699 (stating that the Fourth Amendment protects the people's right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures but "contains no provision
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands"
(quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995))).
6 The views of Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan on whether the exclusionary
rule is a constitutional requirement or a judge-made doctrine are untested.
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700.
6
Id. at 701.
9 Id. (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998)).
10Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653, 659 (1961); see also id. at 649, 657, 659 (stating
that the exclusionary rule is "of constitutional origin" and "is an essential part of
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments"); Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State
Pen., 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
" Mapp, 367 U.,S. at 659.
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does not mean that the apprehended suspect is either innocent or
harmless. If the Court's premises are correct, then the Court is right to
shrink application of the exclusionary rule in some instances such as in
Arizona v. Evans,12 in which police searched a car and uncovered
contraband, acting in good-faith reliance on the assurances of a court
employee that there was an outstanding warrant for the driver, and in
Herring, in which police relied on an isolated incident involving
outdated information in the police computer system that incorrectly
listed a suspect as having an outstanding warrant.' 3
Even embracing the majority's reasoning from Herring for
cases involving isolated police negligence, other cases-those in
which police lie to circumvent the exclusionary rule-reveal that the
majority's current balancing formula places undue emphasis on the
costs associated with release of a guilty defendant and, as a result,
undermines the "truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives" the
majority claims to protect. Imagine a case in which police violate a
suspect's constitutional rights and then lie to cover up their
misconduct. Perhaps on an unsupported hunch, a Kansas Highway
Patrol officer observes a car with Texas license plates driving on a
major highway. The officer observes that the driver appears Hispanic
and that there is a rental sticker attached to the car's rear window.
Without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the
driver has violated any law, the officer stops the car and asks the driver
for permission to search. The driver, now nervous, agrees. The
search, which turns into multiple searches with the help of a drug dog
and other officers, eventually reveals an extensive stash of cocaine.
The officer has successfully identified a guilty person but has used
unconstitutional methods to do so. Understanding that there was no
probable cause for the stop and that application of the exclusionary
rule will doom the case, the trooper goes to court in response to the
defendant's motion to suppress evidence and testifies that the driver
twice veered from his lane of traffic onto the road's shoulder in
violation of Kansas traffic laws.
If the judge accepts the officer's testimony, then there was
probable cause to stop the car and valid consent to search it. As a
result, the defendant's motion to suppress will be denied. If the
motion is denied, the defendant is likely to plead guilty, ending the
case. If, however, the judge rejects the officer's testimony as lacking
12

514 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1995).

1 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 699.

262

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRILVAL LAW

[Vol. 15:259

credibility, the evidence must be suppressed. Without the traffic
infraction, there was no legal basis for the stop. In most cases,
suppression of the evidence means that the guilty defendant goes free.
Although the Kansas officer acted in knowing violation of the
Fourth Amendment while the officer in Herring acted at worst
negligently, the costs of imposing the exclusionary rule are the same in
both cases under the majority's reasoning from Herring. A guilty
person will be released. The difference from Herringis that at least in
theory, the Kansas officer could be deterred from stopping cars
without probable cause. The officer knew that he was acting in
violation of the Constitution; therefore, suppression of the evidence
might convince the officer (and others like him) going forward to stop
only those drivers who violate traffic laws. The flaw in this analysis
rests with the Court's failure to consider a second option. The officer
might, instead, learn to tell a more convincing lie. If the officer falls
into the latter category, then the majority's deterrence-alone
justification for the exclusionary rule leads to an absurd result. Under
the majority's reasoning, the trial judge should deny the motion to
suppress, even though the officer knowingly obtained the evidence
through unconstitutional means. The likelihood of deterrence is not
appreciable; yet, the cost of excluding the evidence-letting the drug
distributor free-remains. Furthermore, because the officer's lie did
not distort the truth about the defendant's guilt for trafficking in drugs,
one might argue that the need for deterrence is marginal anyway.
Albeit demonstrating extensive and culpable police misconduct, from
a deterrence versus cost-of-release perspective, the case looks just like
Herring.

Notably, the Kansas case discussed above is a real case from
my study of the District of Kansas. Prior empirical studies suggest
that this police stop scenario is far from unique. Since 1961, when the
Supreme Court declared in Mapp that the exclusionary rule applies to
both state and federal criminal prosecutions,14 several studies have
concluded that police regularly commit perjury to avoid the exclusion
of evidence.' 5 Because some police do lie to circumvent the
" See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.
1

See, e.g., COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION

AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT:

CoMMIssION REPORT 36 (1994) [hereinafter The Mollen Report] (finding that the

most common form of police corruption in the New York City criminal justice
system was probably "police falsification," especially in connection with arrests for
possession of "narcotics and guns," and that falsification was so common that it had
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exclusionary rule,' 6 the hypothetical posed here demonstrates a critical
defect in the majority's conception. At best, the rule deters some
fraction of unwanted police conduct. But, to use Justice Roberts's
words, it also fails to account for the "costly toll upon truth-seeking
and law enforcement objectives," beyond the release of a guilty
person. Specifically, the majority fails to consider the price of police
perjury in the balance of interests for and against exclusion. As
scholars have argued, police perjury can result in wrongful convictions
and imposes many other costs' 7 that sometimes warrant a remedy as
extreme as release of a guilty defendant. 8
In a perfect world in which the police always tell the truth, or
in which trial judges effectively identify and manage police perjury,
the majority's view of the exclusionary rule might work effectively. In
such a world, there would be only two competing values-the
likelihood of deterring unconstitutional police conduct balanced
against the cost of a failed prosecution. But my Kansas study reveals
spawned the name "testilying."); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,Perjury, and the
HeaterFactor:An ExclusionaryRule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO.
L. REV. 75, 75-76, 82 (1992) [hereinafter Orfield, The 1992 Studv] (discussing the
results of a study on police perjury in the Chicago justice system and concluding that
police fabricate police reports and affidavits for search warrants to create artificial
probable cause); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:An
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016 (1987)
[hereinafter Orfield, The 1987 Study] (reporting that officers admitted that police
sometime lie to avoid the suppression of evidence); Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the
ExclusionaryRule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 739-40 (1970)
(finding that some officers admit to twisting facts to avoid the suppression of
evidence); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure
Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 87, 95 (1968)
[hereinafter Effect ofMapp] (discussing the results of a police perjury study
conducted by Columbia Law students and concluding that police probably fabricated
testimony to create probable cause); JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL
215 (1967) (reporting police perjury based on observation evidence).
6 Interestingly, the most likely reason for police to lie about their conduct in
suppression hearings is the same reason that the U.S. Supreme Court majority gives
for applying the exclusionary rule sparingly. Police do not want guilty defendants to
escape prosecution simply because officers have violated the Constitution in
obtaining the evidence. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and
What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1043 (1996) ("[T]he most common
venue for testilying is the suppression hearing ..... .
" See, e.g., Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1 (2010); 1. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J.
835 (2008); Slobogin, supra note 16.
i Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (Clark, J.).
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that trial judges may be failing to fulfill this important role of
identifying police perjury, either because they are unable to distinguish
carefully crafted lies from truth or because they err on the side of
punishing a culpable defendant, even if police may have lied. In either
event, because some police lie to avoid the effects of the exclusionary
rule, the Supreme Court's current conception of the rule undercounts
the costs associated with police lies that create the appearance that
deterrence is irrelevant because the police claim to have complied with
the Constitution.
The study at the heart of this article evaluates judicial orders
issued over a two-year period in 2008 and 2009 in the District of
Kansas.19 The data derived from the study reveals that criminal
defendants rarely assert in pleadings or hearings that the police lied
about the investigation of their cases. When defendants do make such
claims, they typically make them in the context of moving to suppress
evidence, arguing that the police violated the defendant's
constitutional rights and lied to cover up the violation. In the
suppression context and otherwise, when they allege police dishonesty,
defendants frequently support their allegations with corroborative
evidence. Sometimes, the evidence of police perjury is limited to the
defendant's own testimony, but defendants often produce eyewitnesses
or other proof, such as documents or video recordings. Occasionally,
under cross-examination, the police testify in conflicting ways, casting
doubt on their own testimony. Regardless of the type of evidence
defendants offer in support of their claims, federal trial judges in the
District of Kansas almost always rule in favor of the government and
refuse to apply the exclusionary rule.
In the two-year period studied, defendants asserted police
dishonesty in a small percentage of cases. Judges were asked to
decide allegations of police dishonesty in only thirty-one of 584
orders. In seven cases in which they asserted police dishonesty,
defendants produced little to no evidence to support their claims,
virtually forcing trial judges to rule for the government. In fifteen of
the thirty-one cases in which a defendant claimed that the police lied
about an investigation, the evidence of dishonesty was competing and
could have been decided for the police or the defense, depending on
19 I chose the District of Kansas over other districts because the court's website
provides extensive, publically-available information about the court's rulings.
Comparable information is difficult to find in other trial courts, at a federal or state
level.
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who was burdened with proving credibility. In one of those fifteen
cases, involving a sentencing issue, the trial judge ruled for the
defendant without reaching the credibility issue. In the remaining
fourteen cases with competing evidence, the trial judges decided that
police were believable.
In nine of thirty-one cases, the defendant produced substantial
evidence of at least one significant police error, if not a lie. In one of
the nine cases with the strongest evidence of police dishonesty, the
judge avoided the police credibility issue and decided for the
government as a matter of law. In two cases, trial judges found that
police were not credible. In the remaining six, judges credited police
testimony. In other words, in close cases and in cases in which the
evidence supported a finding of police dishonesty, trial judges usually
decided in favor of the government. The findings of this Kansas study,
therefore, are consistent with various scholars' contentions that trial
judges "habitually accept[] the policeman's word" 20 and may even
ignore police lies "to prevent the suppression of evidence and assure
conviction."n1

Because lies are difficult to prove and hard to distinguish from
innocent mistakes or negligent errors, it is possible that Kansas trial
judges identified police perjury in the only two cases in which it
occurred during the time studied. But when viewed in light of other
studies of police dishonesty, especially in the context of suppression
hearings, it seems at least equally likely that some police lies slipped
ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi-xxii (1983) (identifying thirteen "key

rules" of our justice system, including: "Rule IV: Almost all police lie about whether
they violated the Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants. Rule V: All
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys are aware of Rule IV .... Rule VIII:
Most trial judges pretend to believe police officers who they know are lying");
Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: JudicialResponsibilityfor the Rampart
Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 787, 790-91 (2001) (asserting that judges sometimes
"ignor[e] telltale signs that police officers fabricate testimony to obtain
convictions"); David N. Dorfiman, Proving the Lie: LitigatingPolice Credibility, 26
AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 470-21 (1999) (indicating that "a scathing opinion impugning
the motives, honesty, or competency of police is rarely found in trial court
opinions").
21 Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 76. See also Levenson, supra note 20,
at 790 (describing how judicial conduct can contribute to police dishonesty and
stating that "judges unwittingly participate in police perjury and misconduct by not
critically examining police credibility"); Irving Younger, ConstitutionalProtection
on Search and Seizure Dead?, TRIAL, Aug.-Sept. 1967, at 41 (claiming that judges
rarely recognize police perjury).
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by consciously or sub-consciously undetected 2 Perhaps unwittingly,
the Supreme Court majority's conception of the exclusionary rule
encourages callousness toward police dishonesty and denial of
suppression motions. As currently applied by the majority, the
exclusionary rule focuses on ensuring prosecution of seemingly guilty
defendants to the exclusion of other equally important interests, such
as police integrity, judicial impartiality, and respect for the rule of law.
Relying on the findings from my study of the District of Kansas for
support, this article argues for a more historically grounded, if not
"more majestic," conception of the exclusionary rule.
Dissenting in Herring, Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself
and Justice Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, argued in support of such a
majestic conception, contending that while a primary objective of the
exclusionary rule is deterrence, the rule "also serves other important
purposes," such as allowing judges "to avoid the taint of partnership in
official lawlessness" 24 and preventing the government from profiting
from its own lawless behavior that would "undermine popular trust in
government." 25 Justice Ginsburg's dissent echoes Justice Stevens's
earlier dissent in Evans, in which he contended that the constitutional
text and history of the Fourth Amendment's adoption and
interpretation "identify a more majestic conception" of the
exclusionary rule than limiting its purpose to deterring police
misconduct.26 As Justice Ginsburg noted in Herring, and Justice
Stevens said in Evans, the proper application of the exclusionary rule
merely places the government in the position it would have been in
had there been no unconstitutional search or seizure. Preventing the
government from benefitting from its unlawful behavior protects the
integrity of judges and the judicial system, avoiding the possibility that

See supra notes 15 and 20.
Justice Stevens has, of course, recently retired. Justice Kagan now serves in place
of Justice Stevens. We do not know yet Justice Kagan's views on this issue.
24The majority rejected this "more majestic" conception of the exclusionary rule in
favor of deterrence alone. Herringv. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 n.2 (2009).
25 Id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (noting the importance of judicial
integrity in application of the exclusionary rule).
27 Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Evans, 514 U.S. at 19
(Steven, J., dissenting) (asserting that application of the exclusionary rule is not
harsh because it "merely places the government in the same position as if it had not
conducted the illegal search and seizure in the first place").
22
23
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judges become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a
Constitution they are sworn to uphold." 28
This article demonstrates that this "more majestic" conception
is an essential component of any effective exclusionary rule designed
to deter avoidable police misconduct, particularly because the
Ginsburg-Stevens view better accounts for the costs associated with
failing to apply the exclusionary rule in cases in which the police may
have lied to circumvent the exclusion of evidence. While the goals of
truth-seeking and enforcement of the law may be served by the
admission of evidence obtained because of good faith police mistakes,
the same is not true of evidence tainted by lies told by the very law
enforcement officers who owe a duty to uphold the law.29
This article unfolds in three parts. Part I reviews the results of
studies predating this one. Those earlier studies reveal that police
sometimes commit perjury in suppression hearings to prevent judges
from excluding evidence of a defendant's guilt. Two of the studies
conclude that judges knowingly acquiesce in police perjury so that
they too avoid letting a guilty defendant escape prosecution. Part II of
the article discusses the current study, including my pre-study
hypotheses, the study's methodology, and limits of the study. Part III
presents detailed findings of the study and relies on those findings in
arguing that the majority's conception of the exclusionary rule is illconceived because it ignores the likelihood that police perjury is
interfering with the deterrence of unwanted police misconduct. Part
III then urges the Supreme Court to return to historic precedent
regarding the exclusionary rule and to embrace the Ginsburg-Stevens
"more majestic" version of the exclusionary rule, at least in cases of
potential police dishonesty.

Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223 (recognizing that the existence of the government will be
imperiled if the government fails to observe the law scrupulously).
29 Three experiments conducted by Professor Kenworthey Bilz also suggest that
"reinvigorating the integrity justification" for the exclusionary rule "would serve the
ends of the Rule better than current doctrine [focusing on deterrence alone] does."
Kenworthey Bilz, Dirty Hands or Deterrence? An Experimental Examination of the
Exclusionary Rule 2 (Northwestern Public Research Paper No. 10-28), available at
http: /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id-1629375.
2
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I. PRIOR STUDIES"
Several researchers and groups have studied police perjury.
The studies vary in methods and locations. Despite their diversity,
each study has concluded that police perjury occurs frequently in the
suppression context. Notwithstanding apparent consensus that police
perjury occurs everywhere and too often, there has been little research
on how judges decide issues of police credibility and how much and
what type of evidence seems to influence judges to rule for the
defendant on such allegations. This Part recaps the findings of the
prior studies.
A. Studies Finding Police Perjury Commonplace
The late Irving Younger, who served as prosecutor, judge, and
law professor during his distinguished career, asserted that in the first
few months after the Supreme Court decided Mapp,3 "New York
policemen continued to tell the truth [about how they had obtained
evidence of unlawful drug possession], with the result that in a large
number of cases the evidence was suppressed." 32 Younger declared
that soon "police made the great discovery that if the defendant drops
the narcotics on the ground, after which the policeman arrests him, the
search is reasonable and the evidence is admissible."33 Based on
sudden and systematic changes in police testimony, Younger theorized
that police had begun to lie during hearings and to create stories that
would meet constitutional requirements and avoid suppression of drug
evidence. 3
A study conducted by students at Columbia Law School.
published in 1968, " supported Younger's theory. The students
evaluated the evidentiary grounds for arrest and disposition of
misdemeanor narcotics cases in New York City before and after
Studies that pre-date the decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). which
applied the exclusionary rule to the states, are omitted from this discussion because
scholars commonly assert that it was the decision in lapp that increased the
incentives for police to lie and, correspondingly, the pressure on judges to accept
those lies to avoid excluding evidence of defendants' guilt.
3 Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (applying the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions).
32 Younger, supra note
21, at 41.
30

SId.
Effect of A'app, supra note 15, at 87.
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Mapp.36 The study showed that a significant number of officers had
probably fabricated their testimony to "fit within [the probable cause
requirements] of Mapp" and avoid the suppression of illegally-seized
evidence.3 7 In part, the students' findings were based on data
revealing that after Mapp, there was a "sharp decline" in allegations
that "contraband was found on the defendant's body or hidden in the
premises" and a corresponding, "suspicious rise in cases in which
uniform and plainclothes officers alleged that the defendant dropped
the contraband to the ground" or had it "in hand" or "openly exposed
in the premises."38 The students' research showed "a marked increase
in allegations by uniform and plainclothes men which would fit within
the requirements of Mapp."' 9 As the authors of a 1998 empirical
study of the exclusionary rule said of the Columbia law students'
report: "It strains credulity to believe that after Mapp there just
happened to be a near three-fold increase in arrests based on drugs
found in the open. The more likely conclusion is that the advent of the
exclusionary rule led to a dramatic increase in police fabrication.'" 40
The findings of the "Mollen Commission," which studied
police corruption in New York City some twenty years later, were
consistent with Younger's assertions and the Columbia law students'
findings.41
Formally named the Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures
of the Police Department, the Mollen Commission was appointed in
1992 and produced a written report in 1994 following an extensive
investigation.4 2 As part of the investigation, the Commission analyzed
thousands of police department documents, including Internal Affairs
records, 43 and conducted over one hundred private hearings and
36
1

id
Id. at 103.

" Id. at 95.
Id. See also Sarah Barlow, Patterns ofArrestsfor Misdemeanor Narcotics
Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 549-50
(1968) (studying 3,971 arrests in Manhattan, New York, and suggesting that police
had turned to "dropsy" testimony to avoid application of the exclusionary rule).
4 L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell Caldwell, Carol A. Chase & Ronald W. Fagan, If
It 's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the ExclusionaryRule: A New andExtensive
Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Callfor a Civil Administrative
Remedy to PartiallyReplace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REv. 669, 693 (1998).
4 See The Adollen Report, supra note 15.
42 Id at 1.
4

Id at 11.
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informal interviews.4 4 The interviews included "scores" of meetings
with members of law enforcement who regularly dealt with the New
York police, including employees of the district attorneys' offices,
employees of the U.S. Attorney's office, agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and employees of other federal agencies.45 The
Mollen Commission not only found widespread corruption within the
New York City Police Department but also reported that falsification
by officers, including "testilying," was "probably the most common
form of police corruption."4 6
Using various research methods and evaluating data from
jurisdictions beyond New York, other legal scholars came to the same
reasoned conclusion as did Younger, the Columbia law students, and
the Mollen Commission-that police officers lie with some regularity
to avoid application of the exclusionary rule during suppression
hearings. Based on extensive and personal observation research in a
city of about 400,000 people, Professor Jerome H. Skolnick 47
concluded that police sometimes fabricate probable cause when they
think that search and seizure laws are too restrictive. 48 Skolnick spent
extensive periods with police, "viewing and observing, talking about
the life of the policeman, and the work of the policeman." 49
Skolnick's conclusions were anecdotal, derived from what he saw and
heard from officers, but his study "had the advantage of first-hand
experience.
Joseph Grano undertook a similar observational
study. After spending a year working in a prosecutor's office in
44

_d.

at 11-12.

45 m

46

d. at 36.
Skolnick is a co-director of the Center for Research in Crime and Justice at New
York University School of Law.
41 SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 215 (explaining that when a police officer sees case
law "as a hindrance to his primary task of apprehending criminals, he usually
attenipt[s] to construct the appearance of compliance, rather than allow the offender
to escape apprehension"). Skolnick described the city he studied as "a 'real city,' . . .
reputed to have an exemplary machinery for administering criminal justice." Id. at
25. See also Oaks, supra note 15, at 725 ("Ifthe officer has any reason to conceal
improper behavior, the courtroom issue typically becomes a contest of credibility
that the trier of fact is likely to resolve in favor of the officer.").
49 SKOLNICK, supra note 15, at 33. Skolnick also spent time with prosecutors and
defense lawyers. Id. at 40.
' See Perrin et al., supra note 40, at 710 (detailing previous empirical studies of the
exclusionary rule and critiquing the pros and cons of the Skolnick study).
" Grano died in 2002. When he died, he was a Distinguished Professor of Law at
Wayne State University.
47
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Philadelphia, "handling almost exclusively motions to suppress
evidence," Grano learned that police are "not adverse to committing
perjury to save a case." 52 Grano explained that this conclusion rested
on his "conversations with police officers in preparation for
suppression hearings in which the willingness to change facts was
subtly-and sometimes openly-expressed" and on the fact that in
"many cases" the officers' testimony "seemed incredible" but the court
credited the testimony anyway.53
Dallin Oaks54 explored the effect of the exclusionary rule in
criminal proceedings in Chicago and the District of Columbia5 5 and
reported that during his research "[h]igh-ranking police officers . . .
admitted . . . that some experienced officers will 'twist' the facts in

order to prevent suppression of evidence and release of persons whom
they know to be guilty." 5 6 According to Oaks, one officer maintained:
Fabrication occurs in two types of situations. First, where a
patrolman has made an on-view arrest and officers of a special
detail can reach the scene before he has submitted his written
report, they assist him in submitting a report that will not
prevent a conviction under some rule of an appellate court....
The officer estimated that this type of twisting of facts occurred
in about one-third of the cases where special detail officers
assisted patrolmen with their reports. The second type is a
direct fabrication of probable cause for an arrest and search.
The police stop and search a motor vehicle and its occupants.
If they discover the proceeds or implements of a crime, such as
stolen goods, burglary tools or a weapon, they "hang a traffic
offense on him afterward to ice it up, and they say the
[evidence] was in plain view on the floor when it was really
under the seat."5 7
Joseph D. Grano, A Dilemmafor Defense Counsel: Spinelli-HarrisSearch
Warrants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 405, 409 (1971).
5 Id.
5 Oaks was a law professor at the University of Chicago and later President of
Brigham Young University.
For instance, Oaks obtained data on motions to suppress tiled in each jurisdiction.
Oaks, supra note 15, at 681.
6 Id. at 739-40.
Id at 742. The officer estimated that this second type of fabrication occurs very
often (98% of the time when the target is a "professional" thief but "rarely" if the
subject is not notorious). Id.
52
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In 1992, noting the "limited empirically-grounded information
on the [exclusionary] rule's application and effects," Professor Myron
Orfield 5 1 published the results of a study based on "structured
interviews with judges, prosecutors, and public defenders in the
Chicago criminal court system" in which "respondents outlined a
pattern of pervasive police perjury intended to avoid the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment." 5 9 His research revealed that a sampling of
these lawyers and judges estimated that "police commit perjury
between 20% and 50% of the time they testify on Fourth Amendment
issues." 60 Participants also reported "systematic fabrications in case
reports and affidavits for search warrants, creating artificial probable
cause which forms the basis of later testimony." 6 1 Orfield had
conducted a similar study, published in 1987, during which he
interviewed twenty-six narcotics officers of the Chicago Police
Department. 62 The interviews of police officers, undertaken with a
lengthy questionnaire, asked (among other things) how frequently
officers lie in court. 63 According to Orfield, "Virtually all of the
officers admit that the police commit perjury, if infrequently, at
suppression hearings." ,64 As Orfield noted in the officers article, the
tendency of questions like the ones he posed would be to elicit selfserving responses. Therefore, "it is possible that the frequency of
police lying in court is greater than the police admit." 65
Orfield's intuition about the under-reporting of police lies is
buttressed by the resistance researchers experienced from police
officers more recently when they proposed similar interview questions.
Law professors at Pepperdine University planned to ask police about
the extent to which they lie to avoid the suppression of evidence. In
pre-study testing, though, officer after officer "expressed concern
Orfield is a Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota.
Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 75, 82-83.
60

Id. at 83.

61 Id.

62 Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1024. Orfield "interviewed twenty-six
of approximately one hundred officers in the Narcotics Section" using a twenty-sixpage questionnaire. Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 79-80.
63Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1024-25.
64 Id at 1051. Of the twenty-six officers interviewed, twenty-one responded to the
question about whether police "shade the facts." Id. at 1050. Of those twenty-one
officers, sixteen (76%) agreed that the police do "shade the facts a little (or a lot) to
establish probable cause when there may not have been probable cause in fact." Id.
61Id at 1051.
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about the questions, noting that they essentially required the
respondent to admit or deny committing perjury." 6 6 Each officer who
reviewed the questionnaire before its widespread distribution "urged
that the questions be eliminated." 6 7 In the end, the researchers deleted
the questions.
Although scholars and researchers have uncovered extensive
evidence that at least some police give perjured testimony during
suppression hearings to avoid application of the exclusionary rule,
there has been scant study of how judges manage such perjury. Do
judges effectively identify possible police dishonesty? Do they favor
the government in close cases? Do judges try to avoid such credibility
determinations by ruling as a matter of law without deciding
credibility?
B. The Limited Study of Judicial Rulings on Police Perjury
A number of researchers have studied the effectiveness of the
exclusionary rule in deterring police misconduct, including its success
at reducing police dishonesty such as "testilying,"6 8 A few of those
studies include some information about the types of cases in which
defendants filed suppression motions and the corresponding number of
motions that judges granted. 69 But the studies focusing on judicial
rulings are few and dated, with none taking a detailed look at the
strength of the evidence of police perjury underlying the rulings.

66

Perrin et al, supra note 40, at 718.

67

68 See, e.g., supra note 15.

See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 15, at 689-96, 681-82 (noting that defendants filed
suppression motions most often in narcotics, gambling, and weapons cases); James
E. Spiotto, Search and Seizure, An EmpiricalStudy ofthe Exclusionary Rule and Its
Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 243, 253 (1973) (tracking the trends in a number of
suppression motions filed over extensive periods of time in Chicago before and after
Mapp and finding that motions in serious cases charging murder, burglary and
robbery were met with minimal success). Myron Orfield also reported that evidence
was less likely to be suppressed in "big," important cases than in cases with less
severe offenses. Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 78, 116. Orfield also
found that judges rarely excluded evidence in violent crime cases. Id. at 78. As
Orfield noted when discussing empirical studies that preceded his, studies like
Oaks's and Spiotto's "may be explained by the efforts ofjudges to control
dramatically increased narcotics case loads . . . and . . . judges' use of suppression as
a toll of leniency for relatively minor offenders." Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra
note 15, at 1021.
69
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Orfield's 1987 study, surveying law enforcement officers, and
his 1992 study, surveying judges and practicing criminal lawyers,
compiled opinions about the frequency of police lies in the suppression
context and the impact such lies had on judges' willingness to exclude
evidence. Based on his interviews, Orfield concluded "that judges in
Chicago often knowingly credit police perjury and distort the meaning
of the law to prevent the suppression of evidence and assure
conviction."0 Orfield's interviews revealed that nine out of twelve
judges (75%) responding to questions, fourteen out of fourteen public
defenders (100%), and nine out of fourteen prosecutors (approximately
65%) believed that judges sometimes fail to suppress evidence when
they know police searches are illegal.'
In his similar study of Chicago narcotics officers, 86% of the
twenty-six officers interviewed said that it was "unusual but not rare"
for judges to disbelieve police testimony at a suppression hearing, 72
and one officer reported that judges "never" disbelieve police
testimony.7 3 Based on his findings, Orfield believed that regardless of
the merits of a defendant's argument or corroborating proof of police
dishonesty, judges sometimes intentionally ruled against defendants,
supposedly finding police credible while knowing that police were in
fact lying. Orfield's studies relied on small sample sizes and rested on
opinions as opposed to concrete data. 74 Nevertheless, Orfield's
findings are especially important because they provide insight into
officers', judges', and criminal lawyers' perceptions (if not the reality)
of police perjury.
70

0rfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 75-76. Court respondents believed that
judges "knowingly accept police perjury as truthful." Id. at 83 Orfield randomly
selected fourteen people from forty-one felony trial courtrooms in the Criminal
Division of the Cook County Circuit Court and attempted to interview a judge, an
assistant public defender, and an assistant state's attorney assigned to the courtroom.
Id. at 81.
n Id. at 114-15 Of course, illegal searches do not necessarily amount to police
perjury, but there appears to be a correlation between the two.
72 Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1049.
3

Id.

See Perrin et al., supra note 40, at 681 (criticizing Orfield's 1984 study because of
"the very limited sample size," which the authors claim "limits its value and also
precludes one from drawing any general conclusions about the effect of the
[exclusionary] rule from [Orfield's] results").
7 Based on his own observation study, Joseph Grano believed that judges in
Philadelphia credited police testimony in many suppression cases even though the
testimony "seemed incredible." Grano, supra note 52, at 410.
7
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Studies of the manner, effectiveness, and reliability of trial
judges' decision making on issues of police credibility are particularly
important for the proper and effective application of the exclusionary
rule. The studies cited in this section have shown that some police
commit perjury to avoid application of the rule. Deterrence of
unconstitutional police behaviors (and of police perjury itself) can be
accomplished only if judges recognize when police are lying to
conceal unconstitutional conduct and apply the exclusionary rule,
accordingly, to bar admission of tainted evidence. Thus, if police are
successfully lying to circumvent the exclusionary rule, the deterrence
value of the rule is destroyed.
II. THE CURRENT STUDY -- HYPOTHESES, DATA SAMPLE,
METHODOLOGY, AND LIMITS
Based on the findings of prior studies and other extensive
anecdotal evidence,76 this study presupposed that some undetermined
percentage of police officers lie about aspects of their criminal
investigations and repeat those lies later in court under oath. In this
Part, I explain my pre-study expectations, the data reviewed during the
study, the study's methodology, and the study's limits.
A. Hypotheses
Because scholars of, and participants in, the criminal justice
system appear to agree that police perjury occurs with some frequency,
I expected my study, which involved a systematic review of orders
issued by sitting judges in the District of Kansas, to find that criminal
defendants allege police dishonesty in a substantial number of criminal
cases.7 7
For example, I expected defendants to assert police
See supra note 15; see also Wilson, supra note 17, at 1, 5-15 (cataloging evidence
of police lies and providing multiple examples of video proof of such lies); Brandon
L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COL UM. L. REV. 55 (2008) (analyzing the first
200 cases in which DNA evidence exonerated defendants and finding other evidence
of police dishonesty).
n Remember, one prior study showed that a sampling ofjudges, public defenders,
and prosecutors in Chicago estimated that "police commit perjury between 20 and
50% of the time they testify on Fourth Amendment issues." Orfield, The 1992 Study,
supra note 15, at 83. Because I expected defendants to exercise some restraint in
raising allegations of police dishonesty, I surmised that defendants would assert
police dishonesty in about 20% of all suppression motions that they filed and all
arguments that they made in court.
7

276

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRILVAL LAW

[Vol. 15:259

dishonesty when they could point to a written police report conflicting
with an officer's testimony, when they could produce a video that
seemed inconsistent with such a police report, and when an eyewitness
with no relationship to the defendant would testify favorably for the
defense. Nevertheless, because most defendants are naturally biased,
hoping to avoid conviction and punishment, I expected trial judges in
the District of Kansas to regularly rule for the government on issues of
credibility by finding insufficient proof of perjury in close cases with
no independent and corroborative evidence.
At the start of this project, I also hypothesized that defendants
would typically allege police dishonesty when they pursued motions to
suppress evidence; after all, prior studies had found that police lie most
often during suppression hearings to avoid the exclusionary rule.7 9
Also, despite innuendo to the contrary and Orfield's study of
Chicago's state court system finding the opposite, I expected federal
judges, who sit for life and are somewhat insulated from outside
influences, to find police dishonesty in at least a moderate number of
cases, especially where the defense produced independent evidence of
police inconsistency suggesting either police error or fabrication.
Because we know that some police do commit perjury, especially in
Defense lawyers also understand this perceived bias and are likely to advise their
clients against raising a police credibility argument that does not advance the
defendant's cause because it might, in fact, prove counter-productive. To test this
idea, I asked a highly-experienced federal defender from the District of Kansas to
coinent on how often defendants confide to their lawyers that police have lied and
how often lawyers advise their clients against pursuing the issue of police
dishonesty. The lawyer indicated that the determinative factor is whether proving
dishonesty can advance the defendant's case. The lawyer said that clients "often"
say that the police have lied or were lying. Nevertheless, in only about a quarter of
those cases does the lawyer present the issue to the court, because in many cases,
proving that the police lied will not benefit the client. The lawyer offered Franks
lies as an example. In Franksv. Delaware,438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court
ruled that there is a limited right to challenge the veracity of a police affidavit, ifthe
challenger's allegations are accompanied by an offer of proof. Id. at 171. But, even
if an officer lies in an affidavit in support of a search warrant, the affidavit remains
valid unless the affidavit lacks probable cause when the dishonest parts are removed.
Therefore, proving a Franks lie may not advance a defendant's case. Id at 172 n.8.
Since posting this paper on SSRN in January 2010, 1have heard from other defense
lawyers across the country. Several have told stories of counterproductive results
after raising police credibility issues before a judge. One defense lawyer insisted
that his clients suffer a "trial tax" if, in a bench trial, the lawyer attempts to challenge
police credibility.
7 See supra note 15.
78
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suppression hearings, I expected that in close cases, judges would at
least sometimes err on the side of caution, ruling for the defense,
especially given that the government usually bears the burden of proof.
Understanding that the government bears the burden of proof,80 that
officers typically maintain the ability to accurately document their
investigations, that police lies are difficult to establish, that lies can
result in the conviction of innocent people, 82 and that police lies often
erase constitutionally-guaranteed rights,8 3 I expected federal trial
judges to decide in favor of the defense in a moderate number of cases.
In particular, I expected trial judges to rule for the defense on police
credibility when a motion to suppress or an evidentiary hearing
revealed inconsistencies between and among police statements, when
unbiased eyewitness testimony directly conflicted with police
testimony, and when documents or video contradicted the police.
As detailed in Part III, my hypotheses generally proved
incorrect and my expectations for judges too lofty. Defendants in the
Federal District Court of Kansas rarely complained formally about
police dishonesty, and when they did, they sometimes made their
claims with extremely weak or no evidentiary support. Notably
though, federal trial judges in Kansas rarely found police credibility
lacking even when defendants presented substantial evidence of
significant police mistakes, and potentially outright lies. In other
words, my findings suggest that Irving Younger was correct-that
judges habitually accept the policeman's word. The question is
why? 84 Are judges in the District of Kansas presuming the credibility
" The government does not bear the burden of proof in cases challenging the truth of

statements in an affidavit used to support a warrant. See Franks, 438 U.S. 154.
' Police can document the facts with video, audio, and contemporaneous written
reports of what occurred and when, thus gaining a benefit over defendants who lack
notice of when a search or seizure will occur.
82 See Garrett,supra note 76.
83 Such rights include Fourth Amendment rights that protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures and Fifth Amendment rights that prohibit compelled selfincrimination.
84 Morgan Cloud has offered five reasons that judges may accept police perjury.
First, he argues, police perjury "can be very difficult to determine." Morgan Cloud,
The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMoRY L.J. 1311, 1321 (1994). Second, judges dislike
suppressing probative evidence, especially if suppression will result in the freedom
of a guilty defendant. Id. at 1322. Third, some judges believe that most defendants
are guilty; thus, it "is not too disturbing that evidence will not be suppressed"
because guilty defendants should be punished. Id at 1323. Fourth, judges may
assume that as a class, "criminal defendants will commit perjury"; therefore, judges
credit police testimony over defendant testimony. Id. at 1323. Finally, Cloud says,
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of the police? Are defendants really failing to produce enough
evidence to create doubt about police credibility'? Are judges fairly
and impartially evaluating the evidence before them, yet finding police
inconsistencies to be innocent mistakes'? Part III explores these
questions further with the benefit of this study's findings.
B. Data Pool and Methodology
I reviewed 584 orders issued by federal trial judges5 in
criminal86 cases over a twenty-four-month period in the District of
Kansas. 87 Initially, I reviewed each order to determine whether there
was any reference to police credibility. The review was a full-read
review, not a review for specific words or terms. I chose to read the
orders rather than conduct a word search in an effort to capture both
"Judges simply do not like to call other government officials liars-especially those
who appear regularly in court." Id. at 1323-24. On a related topic, Orfield's 1992
study found that judges fail to suppress evidence in serious cases in which the law
requires suppression for three reasons: 1) a personal sense of justice; 2) fear of
adverse publicity; and 3) fear that suppression will "lead to future difficulty in a
judicial election." Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 121. One state court
judge from the Mid-Atlantic who attended a workshop for this paper, offered his
own insights, including: I) judges need to "back up" any allegations they make that
the police have lied; therefore, it is easier to say that the prosecution has failed to
meet its burden of proof than to say that an officer has committed perjury; and 2) if a
single judge is assigned a large geographic territory, he would have to recuse himself
from future cases after finding that an officer lied. Thus for practical reasons, such a
recusal would be cumbersome.
' In this article, trial judges include U.S. magistrate judges as well as district court
judges because both groups are included on the website which forms the data pool
for this study.
6 Some of the orders included in this study as criminal cases are actually civil
habeas petitions, but I included then in this analysis because the Kansas District
Court identified them as criminal orders and because the petitions present complaints
about the acts or omissions of the police, trial counsel, the trial judge, or some other
aspect of a criminal case.
8I
reviewed all of the orders published in the "Recent Opinions" section on the
website for the United States District Court for the District of Kansas for fiscal years
2008 (from October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2008) and 2009 (from October
1, 2008, through September 30, 2009). See Welcome to the District of Kansas
Internet Site, https:/ecf.ksd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bini/Opinions.pl?currentYear (last
visited Oct. 18, 2010). I chose fiscal years rather than calendar years because the
federal government (including the courts) operates on a fiscal-year basis. The
information I gathered can, therefore, be readily compared to information compiled
by federal prosecutors and reported by the Department of Justice during fiscal years
2008 and 2009.

2010]1

IMPROBABLE CAUSE

279

direct claims of police dishonesty and more subtle claims couched
indirectly in legal arguments or those arguments using words other
than the obvious ones, such as lie, perjury, and credibility. For
example, I wanted to account for the possibility that a defendant might
assert that the government was unable to establish probable cause by a
preponderance of the evidence and then support such a claim with
evidence contradicting the officer's factual justification for conducting
the search or seizure, rather than boldly labeling the officer a liar.
When my initial review of an order indicated that the defense
raised an issue of police dishonesty, I looked further to discern the
details of the claim. If the order failed to provide context, I used the
Pacer system 8 to look for additional documents, such as motions,
briefs, or transcripts, giving more details about the defendant's
dishonesty argument.
Once all of the orders addressing police
dishonesty were identified, I reviewed those orders to classify the type
of motion that gave rise to the dishonesty claim; for instance, was it a
motion to suppress or motion for a new trial? I also determined
whether the case involved drug charges or gun charges, assessed the
type of evidence the defense used to support the argument of police
perjury, charted whether the allegedly offending officer was employed
by the county, state, city, or federal government, identified the judge
who ruled on the motion, and attempted to glean any other information
pertinent to the allegation of police dishonesty.
The most difficult point of classification was deciding whether
an order raised an indirect claim of police dishonesty. In deciding
whether the defendant was indirectly challenging police credibility, I
looked for signs of conflicts in the evidence, for words such as the
government or officer "claims." or an allegation that the government
was unable to carry its burden, and for any argument about the
insufficiency of the evidence, especially if the assertion were coupled
with a discussion of a conflict in the evidence.

' Pacer is an on-line system that allows access to all publically-available pleadings
filed in federal court for a fee of S.08 per page.
89 For instance, in UnitedStates v. Troxel, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Kan. 2008), see
infra Appendix (Case Number 16), I was able to secure a transcript of the motion to
suppress proceedings from the judge's court reporter. I was able to obtain a similar
transcript from Pacer in United States v. Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Kan.
2009), see infra Appendix (Case Number 26).
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C. Limits
As with all studies, this one has limits. Its greatest limit is,
perhaps, the study's inability to connect known lies to judges' rulings.
This article reports data from federal trial judges' rulings on arguments
asserting police dishonesty in criminal investigations and prosecutions,
as well as the types of evidence judges reviewed before issuing a
decision. Unfortunately, there is no determinative way to measure
when police are telling the truth in a particular case. 90 In fact, even
when there exists overwhelming evidence that the police erred about a
fact, we do not know for sure whether the factual error was an
intentional effort to distort the truth or a negligent, unintentional
misjudgment. As a result, this study is necessarily imprecise. Because
we are unable to count the number of lies police tell, I cannot compare
that number to the number of orders in which judges ruled for the
government on police credibility when they should have decided in
favor of defendants, or vice versa. But the difficulty in proving lies is
also why the study is important. Lies are usually difficult to identify,
especially when the lie is told by a professional witness such as a
police officer. And the fairness and dependability of our current
system of justice relies on the ability of participants, like judges and
juries, to effectively decide when witnesses are lying, mistaken, or
telling the truth.
Recognizing that this study cannot produce conclusive answers
about how well judges are executing their roles as truth finders, this
article seeks to provide some useful insight on the subject and to start a
dialogue about how the exclusionary rule should work when some or
significant evidence indicates that police probably engaged in a very
costly form of police misconduct, police perjury. In furtherance of
these goals, in Part Ill, the article establishes a figurative continuum
for orders in the study. That continuum illustrates the relative strength
or weakness of the evidence of police dishonesty and compares those
values to the judges' accompanying rulings.
A second limit of the study is that, like Orfield's and others',
the study's implications are limited by its narrow focus. For instance,
the study looks only at federal court judges, who may respond
differently to allegations of police perjury than do state court judges.
Federal judges are appointed for life and, therefore, avoid re-election
9 Cloud, supra note 84, at 1313 ("We know it exists, but it is impossible to
determine with any precision how often it occurs.").
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attacks that could make them particularly vulnerable to claims of being
"soft on crime." 9 1 They may feel more independence than do their
state counterparts to identify and "punish" officers whom they believe
are lying, regardless of the impact such a ruling may have on an
individual case or on an officer's career.92 In constrast, state court
judges, who generally handle a greater number of cases,9 3 may see the
same officers day in and day out, making it less likely that they will
feel comfortable calling an officer a liar in any one case.94
Furthermore, state court judges sometimes face contentious campaigns
to retain their positions on the court. 95 Because there are notable
differences between the state and federal judicial systems, the results
of this study should not be read to apply equally to state court judges.
Also, federal judges in Kansas may be more or less likely to
acknowledge police lies than federal judges in different parts of the
United States.96 Cultural, population, and political differences among
districts probably affect how comfortable judges feel in addressing
police dishonesty and how likely judges will be to side with the

91 See, e.g., Carlos Berdejo & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics:An
Analyjsis of PoliticalCycles in CriminalSentencing, 92 THE REV. OF ECON. &
STATISTICS 1, 21 (2010).
92

But see United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (changing
original ruling that suppressed large quantity of drugs after reportedly receiving
pressure from the Clinton administration over the initial ruling). Bayless and other
cases suggest that federal judges respond to pressure too. For instance, judges who
aspire to move from the district court to the appellate court may feel such pressure.
For instance, more drug cases are prosecuted in state court than in federal court.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG POLICY

INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE REPORT FOR KANSAS (2008), available at

http://vww.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/statelocal/ks'ks.pdf (showing that in 2006, the
Federal Drug Enforcement Agency made 255 arrests for drug violations in Kansas
while overall, there were 11,937 adult drug arrests in Kansas during that time).
94 See Cloud, supra note 84, at 1323-24 (noting that "[]udges simply do not like to
call other government officials liars-especially those who appear regularly in
court"); see also supra note 84 (discussing one state court judge's view on the risks
of ruling on officer perjury).
In his study of Chicago's criminal justice system, Orfield noted that judges may
fail to suppress evidence because of a desire to avoid adverse publicity or because
they fear that suppression will hurt their chances for re-election. Orfield, The 1992
Study, supra note 15, at 121-122. See also Berdejo & Yuchtman, supra note 91.
96 See Oaks, supra note 15, at 687 (describing differences between the jurisdictions
of Chicago and D.C., including advanced screening of cases by prosecutors in one
district but not the other, resulting in a significantly smaller number of motions to
suppress in D.C. than in Chicago).
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government in doubtful cases.97 In small towns, it is not unusual for
judges to know and like officers, creating a bias in favor of officer
credibility.98
Moreover, even within a single district, there are police
hierarchies that affect police training and motivation. "'[T]he police'
is not a monolithic entity. There are officers in positions of command,
staff, special assignment (like narcotics detail) and patrol, to name
only a few."99 FBI agents, many of whom begin their careers as police
officers or other members of county and state law enforcement, may
receive more training and have more experience and education than
city, county, and state officers, who are generally newer to law
enforcement and paid significantly less. Thus, another limitation of
the study is that to the extent the study does not capture the full
spectrum of police conduct, like investigations and testimony by
federal, state, county, and city officers, the study is under-inclusive. 00
In addition to its other limits, the study does not account for
individual biases. Judges act according to their own beliefs and
prejudices. Therefore, because the sample size is smal],1ot it may over
97

In districts where officers appear repeatedly before the same judge, the judge may
be less likely to discredit an officer's testimony. On the other hand, the opposite
could also prove true. In a district with a smaller number of people, once an officer
gains a reputation for dishonesty, that reputation may be difficult to overcome and
may spread to other judges by word of mouth outside of the courtroom. This risk
may be lessened by the fact that many districts with large populations maintain
multiple offices within the district. For instance, in the Northern District of Georgia,
the U.S. Attorney maintains a presence in the cities of Newnan and Rome, both of
which are much smaller cities than Atlanta, where the U.S. Attorney's main office is
located.
In one case reviewed during this study, a county detective indicated that he had
known a particular state court judge "a long time," that the judge was one of only
two in the area, and that the officer and the judge had worked together in law
enforcement before the latter became ajudge. See Transcript of Motion to Suppress
Proceedings at 68, 87, United States v. Troxel, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Kan. 2008)
(No. 07-20051-JWL). The trial judge had issued a warrant that was the subject of a
suppression motion in federal court. Id.
99 Oaks, supra note 15, at 716.
100
Nevertheless, the study captured investigations by more state, county, and city
officers than I thought it would. Five of the thirty-one judicial orders addressing
police dishonesty did not indicate whether the police were federal or state officers.
Eighteen orders identified state, county or city officers. Four orders identified
federal officers. Four orders referenced both state and federal officers.
'0' Eight different judges issued orders in response to defendants' allegations of
police dishonesty. These judges included: 1) Sam A. Crow; 2) John W. Lungstrum;
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or understate judges' tolerance of allegations of police lies in
general. 102
Moreover, while I reviewed hundreds of orders, an order is
only a subset of a complete case. A single case could produce
numerous orders. One or more orders in a case could decide a claim
of police credibility; other orders in that same case might not mention
the subject. Thus, even when my review of a given order does not
reflect a discussion or claim of dishonesty, I cannot conclude that the
defendant or judge did not discuss police credibility at some other time
during the case. On the other hand, it is likely that when police
dishonesty is important to the defense, whether on suppression or later,
the theme will reoccur and, therefore, may be captured by the review
of other orders within a given case.
Finally, although I reviewed all of the publically available
orders on the District of Kansas's website, a site designed to provide
access to all orders issued in the district, it is likely that some orders
were never posted to the site. Sealed orders are omitted by definition.
Moreover, according to the Clerk's Office, each judge is responsible
for ensuring that his or her orders are uploaded to the site. If an
individual judge or his staff fails to post one or more orders, those
orders will be missed by this study. For example, one district court
judge, who was recently appointed, did not post any orders to the
website during the time under review. Thus, there is no way to
quantify the number of orders that may never have been posted.
II.

FINDINGS
STUDY

AND

SIGNIFICANCE

OF THE CURRENT

In this Part. I present the findings of my study and then explain
how those findings support Justices Ginsburg and Stevens's arguments
for a more majestic version of the exclusionary rule, which considers
interests beyond police deterrence. Part III.A. provides general
information about the types of cases contained in the pool of data. Part
III.B. includes specific information about the types of cases in which
defendants alleged police dishonesty, the number of cases in which
3) Kathryn H. Vratil; 4) Wesley E. Brown; 5) Julie A. Robinson; 6) J. Thomas
Marten; 7) Karen M. Humphreys; and 8) Richard D. Rogers.
102 Oaks, supra note 15, at 716 ("In this incredibly diverse milieu of different
police
departments and criminal justice systems and different individual motivations and
sensitivity to sanctions, the researcher must consider not one but a variety of possible
effects . . . some subtle and some obvious.").
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defendants convinced judges to decide in their favor, and the types and
strength of evidence that defendants presented in support of their
arguments.
A. General Findings
In all, the Kansas District Court issued and posted 584 orders
during the twenty-four-month period studied, from October 1, 2007,
through September 30, 2009. Of those 584 orders, 142 resolved issues
of pretrial detention.103 The detention orders were tyically one or two
pages and reflected a summary proceeding in which a defendant
agreed to detention or the government proffered "evidence," after
which the judge found sufficient grounds to incarcerate the defendant
pretrial. Not one of these detention orders reflected a dispute about
police perjury.
In contrast to the 142 short detention orders, sixty-six of the
584 orders decided motions to suppress evidence.1 04
These
suppression orders were substantially longer and were often combined
with discovery motions. Twenty-four of the sixty-six suppression
orders (about 36%) alleged unlawful police dishonesty. Habeas
petitions, seeking to amend or modify a defendant's sentence, also
represented a significant number (seventy-two of 584) of motions
decided in the two-year period. Four of the seventy-two orders
arguing habeas issues alleged police lies.

103 These

were almost always issued by a magistrate judge.
Included in this count of motions to suppress are motions to reconsider the denial
of an earlier motion to suppress.
04
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Types of Orders Issued in the District of
Kansas in
FY 2008 and FY 2009

*Detention Orders

25%

*Orders on Motions to Suppress

COrders on Habeas Petitions
%
2%

0AIl Other Orders

Although the 584 orders were issued in a multitude of case
types, including cases charging violations of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, bank robbery, violations of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the making of false bomb threats, and
fraud counts, 53% of the 584 orders were issued in cases involving

drug and gun charges.

05

Orders in Drug and Gun Cases in the District of
Kansas in FY 2008 and FY 2009

aDrug Cases

47%

3Gun cases
MOther Types

105 In

FY 2008, 107 of 280 orders (38%) were issued in drug cases, and in FY 2009,
judges ruled on 108 out of 304 (about 36%) motions in cases charging drug
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A. Specific Findings on Police Dishonesty
1. The Numbers
Although there is convincing evidence that police dishonesty,
including perjury, is a prevalent and serious problem, in the District of
Kansas, defendants and their lawyers rarely accused officers of
lying. 106 Of the 584 orders issued in the twenty-four months under
review, only thirty-one orders (approximately 5% of all orders)
resolved an issue of police credibility on the defense's urging.107
Whether defendants or their lawyers privately assert that the police are
prone to lie or that officers have been dishonest about the facts in a
given case, os they rarely express that view in Kansas federal court
pleadings and hearings. Even excluding the detention orders, which
were the product of summary proceedings, none of which reflected a
discussion of police credibility, defendants asserted police dishonesty
only 7% of the time.

violations. Compare the total of 215 orders in drug cases in the twenty-four-month
period to figures from the Department of Justice reporting that in FY 2008 14.519
cases of 63,042 (about 23%) charged drug offenses.
106 Compare these findings with those assertions in Cloud, supra note 84, at 1314
("Defendants and their lawyers often are willing to accuse officers of lying, but these
claims typically receive little attention beyond the lawsuits in which the accusations
are made."); Amir Efrati, Legal System Struggles With How to React When Police
Officers Lie, THE WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2009),

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12331936736462 721 1.html ( "[O]ne of the most
common accusations by defendants and defense attorneys" is that "police officers
don't tell the truth on the witness stand.").
107 Other than the Maldonado case, see discussion infra pp. 46-51, in which the
defendant indirectly suggested police dishonesty and the judge appeared to doubt
police credibility on his own, there were no orders indicating that a judge raised an
issue of police dishonesty sua sponte.
108 See Efrati, supra
note 106.
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Orders Addressing Police Dishonesty in the District
of Kansas in FY 2008 and FY 2009
7%

BOrders Addressing Police
Dishonesty
*Orders With No Discussion of
Police Dishonesty

93%.

Usually the defendant will know when the police have lied;
therefore, this finding could mean that police dishonesty rarely occurs
in the District of Kansas. The finding might also reflect that
prosecutors are screening out many of the cases with the strongest
evidence of police dishonesty, refusing to pursue charges in those
cases. On the other hand, even if the defendant knows that officers
have falsified police reports, lied in affidavits to secure a warrant, or
committed perjury in a hearing to justify a search in which the
defendant's constitutional rights were violated, she may forego an
argument of police dishonesty in court. If the defense is convinced
that such an argument is unlikely to advance her cause, because of the
defendant's inherent bias, because of lack of corroborative proof,
because she perceives judges generally or this particular judge as progovernment, or because the prosecutor will withhold a sentencing
benefit of acceptance of responsibility if the defendant pursues a
pretrial motion (such as a motion to suppress), a defendant may
withhold dishonesty arguments, even when the police have, in fact,
lied.
Also, because it is generally viewed as "indelicate" to call any
witness a liar,109 let alone a police witness, defendants may reserve
police dishonesty as a last resort defense, asserting it only if they have
109Cloud, supra note 84, at 1324 (noting also that many trial lawyers think it is a
"tactical mistake to call any witness a liar-unless the lie is palpable and the witness
is unsavory").
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no other legitimate or persuasive argument. This inference is logical
given that even when defendants claimed that the police lied, about
42% of the time they did so in subtle and indirect ways without using
words such as lie, perjury, dishonest, or false. Of the thirty-one cases
in which the defense argued that police lied during some portion of a
case, thirteen of the arguments were couched in language or legal
arguments that implied police dishonesty without actually saying that
an officer perjured herself or lacked credibility. For instance, in one
case" 0 the defendant asserted a violation of Miranda, claiming that he
did not speak English well enough to understand or waive his rights,
while also making a Fourth Amendment argument, contending that
police lacked probable cause for a stop of his vehicle, despite an
officer's citation of the defendant for driving his truck over the "fog
line."'1 The defendant never directly said that the police lied about
his waiver of Miranda rights, although the implication seemed clear.
The Court appeared to understand this implication. On the Miranda
issue, the Court found: "[D]efendant's claimed inability to understand
English is belied by the evidence and testimony. First, Trooper
2
Henderson testified that defendant fully understood English ...
Maybe defendants choose subtlety because calling someone a
liar is considered rude." 3 Maybe defense lawyers believe that their
clients have the greatest chance of winning a motion using a legal
argument, instead of directly claiming police perjury. Perhaps defense
lawyers believe, as did Irving Younger. that judicial recognition of
police dishonesty is so uncommon that it will rarely advance the
defendant's cause to assert police lies, unless the proof is
overwhelming.114 Or, maybe defense lawyers fail to adequately
investigate claims of police dishonesty and are left with a lack of
evidence of police scienter. 15
Regardless of their reasons, very few defendants asserted
police dishonesty in court, and in the period studied, approximately
42% of the time, defendants couched the few police dishonesty
110United States v. Perales, No. 08-40055-JAR, 2008 WL 4974807 (Nov. 19, 2008);
see infra Appendix (Case Number 21).
ni The fog line divides the driving lane from the shoulder of the road.
112 Perales, 2008 WL 4974807.
113See Cloud, supra note 84,
at 1324.
114 See supra note
2 1.
115 This lack of investigation could result from lack of resources,
too many cases to
investigate, cynicism about defendants' claims of police dishonesty, or cynicism
about the chance of convincing a judge, among other reasons.
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arguments they made in vague, polite, legal arguments or in indirect
ways, without using words such as perjury, falsify, scienter, or lie.
Because our legal system is an adversarial one, I do not expect judges
to look for police lies when the defendant has failed to allege police
dishonesty. Lack of such arguments may suggest that defense lawyers
bear some of the blame for judges' tendency to regularly rule for the
police.
Nevertheless, even if defense lawyers share some
responsibility, their failure to assert the issues frequently does not
explain judges" reluctance to accept the arguments that are made. Of
the thirty-one orders discussing police dishonesty (see Appendix,
detailing each of the thirty-one orders), only two orders found that an
officer lied during a hearing or falsified material information in an
affidavit."'
Because there is no sure method of establishing that police
have lied, we cannot know if trial judges in the District of Kansas, like
Orfield alleged of judges in Chicago, are "pretend[ing] to believe
police officers who they know are lying.""
Maybe officers in the
District of Kansas tell fewer lies than officers tell in other parts of the
country, such as Illinois and New York. Maybe prosecutors in Kansas
refuse to prosecute cases when they suspect police dishonesty. Maybe
judges in this district are astute at identifying lies and accurately
recognized police perjury in every case in which such lying occurred
during the time studied. But the low percentages of orders finding
police perjury support Irving Younger's belief that 'judicial
recognition of [police perjury] is extremely rare" 118 and his claim that
judges "habitually accept[] the policeman's word."' 19 Notably, Myron
Orfield's study concluded that police perjury may occur in 22 to 53%
of suppression matters in Chicago. 120 In the study, 92% of judges,
a third order, the trial judge ruled that the government had failed to carry its
burden of proof but did not find police dishonesty. See United States v. Burtin, No.
07-10111-01 -WEB (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 2007); infra Appendix (Case Number 6).
1 See Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 75-76; see also DERSHOWITZ,
supra note 20, at xxi.
1 See Younger, supra note 21, at 41.
116In

120 Orfield's

figures related to police lies told under oath during suppression
hearings, not to other types of proceedings (like trials) and false statements in police
affidavits. Orfield, Thel992 Study, supra note 15, at 107. More specifically,
Orfield's study showed that public defenders in Chicago believed that police lie 53%
of the time and that 2 2 % of all respondents opined that police lie more than half of
the time. Orfield's earlier study revealed that 95% of responding officers believed
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prosecutors, and defense lawyers who participated believed that police
lie in court to avoid suppression at least "some of the time," and 220%
thought police lie more than half of the time when they testify in
relation to Fourth Amendment issues. 121
Although the District of Kansas does not contain a city as big
as Chicago, and there is no additional proof that police in Kansas lie
with the same regularity as Orfield found in that city, the difference
between the percentage of police lies Orfield found and the percentage
that Kansas judges identified is staggering. If police perjury occurs in
Kansas at a rate of 22%, which is the lower end of the figures the
Chicago study found, then federal trial judges in Kansas are
facilitating perjury, consciously or subconsciously.12 2 Kansas trial
judges found police lies in less than half of 1% of all of the Kansas
District Court orders studied. They identified police perjury in only
8% of cases in which suppression hearings were held, and they agreed
with defendants in less than 7% of all cases claiming police perjury.123
Number of Orders Accepting Allegations of
Perjury in the District of Kansas in FY 2008
and FY 2009
7%

QOrders Rejecting
Defendants' Claims of Police
Dishonesty

ri Orders Accepting
Defendants' Arguments of
Police Dishonesty
93%

that officers sometimes lie in court to avoid the suppression of evidence. Orfield.,
The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1050 n.130.
121 Public defenders thought police perjury occurred 53%
of the time police testify
about Fourth Amendment matters. Orfield, The 1992 Study, supra note 15, at 107.
122 Although this study is not confined to suppression
matters, as was Orfield's,
Orfield's findings are still significant because, as explained later, this study also
determined that a large percentage of defendants' claims of police dishonesty arise ini
suppression matters. Thus, rejection of these claims by Kansas judges would tend to
encourage police to lie in the suppression context.
123As Orfield noted in his 1992 Study, "it is not clear whether judges' unwillingness
to suppress evidence ... is an entirely conscious process." Orfield, 1992 Study,
supra note 15, at 121.
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Although trial judges in Kansas identified very few police lies,
the lies that judges did detect and the circumstances in which
defendants asserted such perjury are consistent with Orfield's belief
that police perjury occurs most often in suppression matters.124 Like
Orfield's study of Chicago, this study found that motions challenging
searches and seizures accounted for a substantial portion of the cases
in which defendants in Kansas claimed that police lied. Of the thirtyone cases asserting police dishonesty, twenty-six (approximately 84%)
involved challenges to a search, a seizure, or both. 125 In five cases
(approximately 16%), a defendant asserted both a violation of search
and seizure law and a breach of Miranda or Fifth Amendment rights.
In only five of thirty-one cases (16%) a defendant asserted police
dishonesty in a context other than search or seizure. 126

See Orfield, The 1987 Study, supra note 15, at 1050-51; Orfield, The 1992
Study,
supra note 15, at 83. The findings from this study also coincide with Professor
Slobogin's (and other scholars*) intuition that "the most common venue for testilying
is the suppression hearing." See Slobogin, supra note 16.
12 Twenty-five of those twenty-six cases (approximately 96%4), involved a claim that
the unlawful search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment; in the remaining
case, the defendant claimed that the unlawful search violated Title III, which governs
wire taps.
126 One defendant claimed that a detective testified falsely during trial while
authenticating the defendant's voice on a taped phone call. United States v. Parker,
521 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D. Kan. 2007). See infra Appendix (Case Number 3). One
defendant contended that agents attributed too many grams of methamphetamine to
him for purposes of sentencing. United States v. Burtin, No. 07-10111-01-WEB (D.
Kan. Dec. 18, 2007). See infra Appendix (Case Number 6). One claimed that an
agent lied at trial about the defendant's post-arrest statements. United States v.
Ndiaye, No. 05-40017-02-SAC, 2008 WL 4066339 (Aug. 28, 2008). See infra
Appendix (Case Number 15). A fourth defendant alleged that an agent testified in a
way that attributed a greater quantity of Ecstacy to the defendant than was accurate.
United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-10002-03-WEB, 2008 WL 5095996 (Nov. 26,
2008). See infra Appendix (Case Number 22). A fifth defendant asserted police
dishonesty and corruption in the context of a habeas petition, alleging that a corrupt
officer tainted the investigation in the defendant's drug case. United States v.
Johnson, No. 03-40139-01-JAR, 2009 WL 2043496 (Jul. 14, 2009). See infra
Appendix (Case Number 27).
124
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Orders Ruling on Alleged Police Dishonesty in
Search and Seizure Context
16%

El Orders Addressing Police

Dishonesty in the Context of a
Challenge to Search and Seizure

Cl Orders Addressing Police
Dishonesty Outside the Search
and Seizure Context

84%

The findings from this study of Kansas judges are also
consistent with Dallin Oaks's 1969 study in which he concluded that
illegal searches and seizures occurred primarily in weapons and drug
cases.127 Of the thirty-one orders discussing police lies, twenty-two
(approximately 71%) were issued in "drug" cases.
Although
defendants asserted police dishonesty more often in drug cases than in
any other type, drug offenses make up only about 23% of all federal
offenses prosecuted by U.S. attorneys across the nation. 12 Gun cases
were the second most popular for claims of police perjury. Ten of
thirty-one orders discussed police dishonesty in cases charging the
defendant with a "gun" crime-possessing a firearm as a convicted
felon, possessing a gun while unlawfully using drugs, or committing a
robbery or gang violence using a firearm. Although defendants
asserted police dishonesty in gun cases at a significantly higher rate
than they asserted dishonesty in other non-drug cases, gun cases
constitute only about 6% of federal prosecutions in a given year.129
127

See Oaks, supra note 15, at 682.

128 See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, CRIMINAL
CASES
FILED AND DISPOSED OF AND NUMBER OF DEFENDANiS HANDLED BY U.S.

ATTORNEYS FOR FY 2008, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t572008.pdf.
129 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, SUSPECTS ARRESTED
FOR FEDERAL OFFENSES
AND BOOKED BY THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, BY OFFENSE, OCTOBER 1, 2004 -

SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, available at

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/fjsst/2005/tables//fjs05st101.cfm (indicating
that for Fiscal Year 2006, only 6.2% of cases were weapon offenses). Notably, in
this study, approximately 37% of the 584 orders issued were issued in cases
involving drug charges. See supra Part Ill.A.
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Moreover, four orders decided perjury issues in cases charging both
drug and gun offenses.>10
Orders Addressing Allegations of Police Dishonesty in
Gun and Drug Cases
10%
0 Cases Charging Drug Crimes (But
No Gun Charges)
13ICases Charging Gun Crimes (But
No Drug Charge)

GCases

Charging Both Gun and
Drug Crimes
19%

MCases With No Gun or Drug
Crimes Charged

The findings of this study show that the issues of police perjury
are not flooding the courts. Instead, police perjury is rarely asserted.
When matters of police credibility do arise, such issues typically
surface in the suppression context, in which judges exercise complete
control over credibility findings. Although defendants are not quick to
claim that police have lied, judges rarely accept the arguments
defendants do make. Of thirty-one orders discussing police dishonesty
(see Appendix). only two ruled for the defendant, finding that an
officer lied during a hearing or falsified material information in an

affidavit.131
2. The Evidence Underlying the Numbers.
If judges are effectively identifying and managing police
perjury within the suppression context, then in Kansas and elsewhere,
judges are playing a pivotal role in deterring and neutralizing
130 Two of the orders were issued in cases alleging violations of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act; the other was a case charging the defendant with making a false bomb
threat.
131In a third order, the trial judge ruled that the government had failed to carry its
burden of proof but did not find police dishonesty. See United States v. Burtin, No.
07-10111-01-WEB (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 2007). See infra Appendix (Case Number 6).
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potentially devastating police dishonesty because the vast majority of
allegations of police dishonesty occur in that context, where judges,
not jurors, decide credibility. In addition, if judges are effectively
managing police dishonesty at the suppression stage of a case, the
Supreme Court majority's vision for the exclusionary rule is probably
resulting in the proper balance of deterrence, truth-finding, and
effective law enforcement. To further evaluate whether judges are
making this type of contribution to the ideal of a fair and impartial
justice system, this section analyzes each of the thirty-one cases in
which a Kansas trial judge decided a police credibility issue. Each
case is then placed on a figurative continuum reflecting this author's
post-hoc analysis of the strength or weakness of the evidence
underlying the claim of dishonesty.
Because lies combine inaccuracy with difficult-to-probe intent
to distort the truth, the most diligent and fair-minded judge might
mistake a lie for an inaccuracy. But we know from other studies,
police admissions, highly publicized incidents of police corruption
caught on video, and many other sources, that police officers do lie.
As a result, judges must begin to think critically about the probability
in a given case that an officer is lying. Given that lies are difficult to
prove, judges should pay special attention in cases with evidence of
significant inaccuracies, particularly if the source of that evidence is an
unbiased witness, tangible evidence, or evidence corroborated by
multiple sources.
For purposes of this study, each of the thirty-one credibility
cases is considered in terms of the weight of the evidence. Thus, easy
cases rest on each end of the police dishonesty continuum. An
extreme example of a case involving overwhelming evidence of police
dishonesty would be a case like the recently publicized incident in
Hollywood, Florida, in which officers were seen and heard on video
discussing how they intended to write a false police report and take
distorting pictures to make an automobile accident look as though the
defendant had caused it, even though one of the police officers was at
fault in the crash.132
In contrast to this end of the figurative spectrum that signifies
the highly probable police lie, the opposite end marks highly doubtful
police dishonesty. On this end would sit the hypothetical case in
Todd Wright, ChargesDroppedAgainst Woman Framedby Cops, NBC
MIAMI,
July 29, 2009, http://www.nbcmiami.con/news/local-beat/Cops-Set-Up-WomanAfter-Crash.html
132
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which an officer testifies clearly and without contradiction and those
cases in which audio, video, and other evidence corroborate the
officer's resolute testimony.
Working from cases with the weakest evidence of police
dishonesty and the lowest probability of perjury to the most probable,
the thirty-one Kansas cases break down this way: in six of thirty-one
(about 19%) in which defendants alleged police perjury,1 33 the defense
failed to produce any (or almost any) evidence to support the claim.
These six cases were undoubtedly decided correctly on the dishonesty
issue. Whether or not the police engaged in deception or perjury, no
reasonable judge or jury could have logically concluded that the police
had, because evidence of mistakes, let alone intentional distortion, was
lacking. These cases, which include Case Numbers 1, 3, 5, 10, 15 and
21,134 (see Appendix) fall on the left side of the continuum, marking
cases with weak evidence of police perjury.
133 Sometimes

perjury is alleged directly; other times it is alleged indirectly.
134 In three of the six cases (Numbers 5, 10, and 15) in which the defendant produced
no supporting evidence of police dishonesty, the defendant was unrepresented by
counsel. In two of the three cases (Numbers 3 and 21) in which the defendant was
represented, the attorney appeared to accede to raising the police credibility issue
either without sufficient supporting evidence or despite the posture of the case that
made credibility an irrelevant issue. In Case Number 3, the defendant challenged the
credibility of an officer who testified at defendant's trial. The judge rejected the
claim, noting that the jury had decided credibility as part of its verdict. United States
v. Parker, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176 (D. Kan. 2007). In Case Number 21. the
lawyer raised police credibility without proof and in the face of video evidence of a
traffic stop that corroborated the government's version of events. In the one
remaining case (Case Number 1) in which the defendant was represented by counsel
and raised an issue of police dishonesty, yet produced no evidence, it appears that the
lawyer wanted to argue lack of probable cause without asserting police dishonesty,
but the defendant would not yield the dishonesty point at the hearing. At the
evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress, the defendant argued that the
magistrate issuing the warrant was misled by information in the police affidavit that
the officer knew to be false. According to the judge: "At the hearing, the defendant
opposed the introduction of evidence clarifying that he was not challenging the
affiant's actual or constructive knowledge of the truthfulness of matters ... in the
affidavit." United States v. Harvey, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1261 (D. Kan. 2007).
Thus, reading between the lines, the defendant believed that the police had lied in a
sworn affidavit, but the defendant's lawyer thought the best chance of success on the
motion to suppress rested with a legal argument. See infra Appendix (Case Number
1) (stating that defendant "summarily argue[d]" the police lies point but "fail[ed] to
identify what information ... was misleading ... and was known . . . to be false");

infra Appendix (Case Number 13) (stating that defendant "made no offer of proof
that Officer Garman misrepresented her criminal history"); infra Appendix (Case
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In the remaining twenty-five cases (of the thirty-one total) in
which the defense raised a claim of police perjury, there was at least
some evidentiary support, even if that evidence consisted solely of the
defendant's own testimony. Nevertheless, in one of these twenty-five
cases, the defendant's evidence was especially weak and the
government's evidence substantial.
In Case Number 28 (see
Appendix), two officers testified and the government produced a video
that corroborated their testimony. Thus, the trial judge reached the
correct result from an evidentiary standpoint.
The defendant's
evidence of perjury was simply no match for the government's
evidence. Thus, in seven of thirty-one cases (about 23%) in which
Kansas federal trial judges decided police credibility, they appeared to
reach a result demanded by the evidence. Correspondingly, these
seven cases give no support for Orfield's finding that judges
"knowingly credit police perjury and distort the meaning of the law to
prevent the suppression of evidence and assure conviction."
Weakest
Evidence of
Police
Dishonesty
19%

31 Total Cases

Percent & Number of Cases
4%

48%

Strongest
Evidence of
Police
Dishonesty
29%

No/Almost
No Evidence

Thin
Evidence

Competing
Evidence

Substantial
Evidence

Cases 1, 3,
5, 10, 15,21

Case 28

Cases 6, 7, 9, 11,13, 14, 17, 19,
20, 22,23,24,25,29,31

Cases 2, 4, 8, 12,
16, 18, 26, 27, 30

In an additional fifteen (of the thirty-one total) cases (about
48%), the evidence was competing and could have been decided for
either the police or the defense, depending on who was burdened with
proving (or disproving) a lie and by what percentage of
persuasiveness. These Cases included Numbers 6. 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 17,
19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, and 31 (see Appendix). In several of these

Number 14) ("While defendant denies committing this [traffic] infraction in his
motion, he has offered no such proof.").
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fifteen cases, the defendant testified to police dishonesty.1- In some
of them. the defendant offered testimony from an eyewitness.
Sometimes the witness was easily impeached as biased because he or
she was related to, acquainted with, or employed by the defendant.' 36
In other cases, the witness appeared to have no obvious bias for the
defense but exhibited no particular characteristics of reliability or
persuasiveness either.' 3 7 In one of these fifteen cases, the trial judge
In Case Number 7, the defendant testified that officers entered the curtilage of his
home to take and search his trash. The police testified, to the contrary, that the trash
they took and searched fell outside the defendant's fence in an area that typically is
used for sidewalk, where trash is collected. The officers also produced a picture of
the general area, demonstrating where the curb sat in relation to the fencing and
home. In Case Number 13, defendant claimed that police lied about her criminal
history in an affidavit to obtain a wire tap of her phone. In Case Number 14, the
defendant denied that he committed any traffic infractions leading to a stop and
search of his car. In Case Number 22, the defendant testified that officers had
attributed to him more Ecstacy pills than he had possessed. In Case Number 25, the
defendant claimed that officers distorted and withheld information obtained from a
cooperating witness to obtain a search warrant for his home.
136
In Case Number 9, two officers gave consistent testimony about how they
uncovered a gun hidden on the defendant. The defendant offered a witness who
lived in the apartment complex where the defendant was arrested. The eyewitness
contradicted the officers' version of arrest and said that the defendant had found the
gun in a mailbox just before police arrived. In Case Number 11, the defendant
offered his wife's statement that officers told her that she would be released from her
arrest and that her infant child, who was with her at the time of the arrest, would not
be turned over to children's services if the wife agreed to cooperate with police,
including consenting to a search of her home, which she shared with the defendant.
In Case Numbers 19 and 20, charging enviromnental crimes, the defendants offered
testimony from a contractor that worked for their companies. The contractor
testified to his normal routine which contradicted the officer's testimony about the
happenings at the time of his inspection of the defendants' equipment.
1 In Case Number 17, the defendant introduced testimony from an eyewitness, an
inmate at Phillips County Jail, who watched officers use a drug dog to sniff
defendant's car. The witness testified that he did not observe the dog react to the car.
In Case Number 24. the defendant produced an affidavit, but no live testimony, from
a citizen witness who provided an alibi for defendant's whereabouts. That testimony
contradicted an officer's affidavit used to obtain a warrant to search the defendant's
home. In Case Number 31, the defendant's wife testified in direct contradiction to
an officer. The officer claimed to have seen the defendant hiding a "long gun" when
he emerged from his home. The wife testified that the defendant had been holding a
phone in one hand but nothing, and certainly not a gun or rifle, in the other. In all, I
identified seven orders reflecting witnesses other than a police officer or the
defendant: Case Number 9 (two officers testified for the government; defendant
called an eyewitness to testify on his behalf); Case Number 17 (two deputies testified
that dog alerted on defendant's car; defendant introduced an eyewitness who testified
15
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never reached the police credibility issue but ruled for the defense for
other legal reasons.
In two of the fifteen cases, common sense
seemed to support the defense's version of events.13 9 Regardless of
the type of evidence the defendant produced, in none of these fifteen
cases did the trial judge credit the defendant's argument that the police
had lied.
that he did not see dog alert); Case Number 19 (defendant called contract pumper as
witness to dispute agent's testimony that he could see into open heater/treater); Case
Number 20 (same as Case Number 19); Case Number 24 (defendant offered alibi
witness contradicting officer's statements in an affidavit); Case Number 29 (a citizen
witness testified for the defendant and contradicted two officers' testimony); and
Case Number 31 (two officers testified for the government and defendant's wife,
who was an eyewitness, testified for defendant). None of these witnesses convinced
the trial judge that the police lacked credibility. See infra Appendix.
13 In Case Number 6, the defendant implied that the police lied about the amount of
drugs he possessed and objected to a sentence based on 8.58 grams of
methamphetamine the government attributed to the defendant. The trial judge did
not reach the perjury issue but concluded that the government had failed to provide
sufficient evidentiary support to include that amount of drugs in defendant's relevant
conduct for sentencing purposes.
139
In Case Number 11, the defendant, who had been arrested after his wife consented
to a search of their home, produced evidence that his wife consented after she was
arrested in the presence of her infant daughter and was told by officers that she could
avoid prosecution and avoid losing her child to child welfare services if she allowed
the search. The officers denied making such threats, but common sense suggests that
they probably did tell the wife that unless she cooperated with the investigation, the
infant child would be taken fiom her, at least temporarily, while she was transported,
booked, and held in jail. What else could the police do with the infant upon arrest of
the wife? Similarly, in Case Number 29, police testified that they went to the
defendant's home to conduct a "knock and talk." Finding the defendant not at home,
they talked with a woman (who was later identified as defendant's mother or mother
in law) and asked her permission to search the house. There was competing
testimony from the woman and the officers. Part of the officers' testimony defied
common sense. For instance, when the woman supposedly invited the officers into
the home, one officer testified that he asked to move from the kitchen, according to
the officer a potentially dangerous area for a knock and talk, although he admitted
that the woman posed no danger to the officers. When the officer asked to move to
another area of the house, the officer claimed that the woman took him into a room
with marijuana lying out in plain view. See United States v. Ridley, 639 F. Supp. 2d
1235, (D. Kan. 2009). According to the officer, having allowed the officers to see
the drugs in plain view, the woman, nevertheless, denied their request to search the
home. Id In addition, the two officers gave diverging testimony on one important
point. The second officer never heard the first ask to move to another room from the
kitchen. The woman, apparently, with some hesitation and inconsistency in her own
testimony, said that she felt forced by the officers' authority to leave the kitchen and
allow them into other parts of the home.
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Because the evidence was competing in each of these cases, I
cannot conclude that judges consciously favored the government while
knowing or believing that an officer lied under oath. But given that
the government usually bears the burden of proof by at least a
preponderance of the evidence,140 what accounts for the judges
awarding every tie in the evidence to the government? Because in
these cases the amount and type of the evidence seemed equally
balanced or slightly more favorable to the defendant, at least in some
cases, the judges must have granted the government the benefit of the
doubt. In other words, the judges must have presumed that officers
were telling the truth, even when there was equal or even significant
reason to doubt their credibility. Or, the judges must have, at least
occasionally, ruled for the government while suspecting that the police
were in fact mistaken or lying.
What about the remaining nine of thirty-one cases (about 29%)
in which the defendant contended that police lied? In each, the
defendant produced substantial evidence of at least one significant
false statement by police, suggesting that police committed an
extensive error or committed perjury. In nine cases, Case Numbers
11
0,4
2, 141 4, 142 8, 143 12, 144 16, 145 18, 146 26,14147 27,148
and 30,149
the defendant
Except for cases involving "Franks" challenges, in which the defendant bears the
burden by a preponderance.
141 In Case Number 2, the defendant claimed that police entered his home without a
warrant. The defendant called a police witness during the hearing on his motion to
suppress. The officer testified that the defendant had committed a probation
violation and admitted that his police report incorrectly said that the defendant had
comnitted a parole violation. The government failed to produce the disputed
warrant at the hearing. Nevertheless, after criticizing the govermnent for its failure
to produce the warrant, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence, based
on officer testimony, that the warrant did exist at the time of the search.
142 In Case Number 4, the defendant produced evidence that the police possessed
numerous documents showing that the residence they intended to search was not
owned by the defendant; yet, they obtained a warrant for defendant's home and
searched it. The trial judge expressly acknowledged that the police affidavit
contained false statements about ownership of the home searched but attributed the
false statements to police inadvertence, not intentional deception.
113 In Case Number 8, an officer claimed that he looked in a car at defendant's
insistence to find the defendant's identification and observed a baggie of cocaine in
plain view on the floorboard of the car. Defendant denied that the cocaine was in
plain view or on the floorboard. Common sense also suggests that the officer's
testimony was doubtful. The judge avoided the issue, ruling that a search of the car,
which would have been justified by the defendant's post-search arrest, was a search
incident to arrest and thus mooted the police dishonesty issue.
1
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produced evidence through his or her own testimony, the testimony of
eyewitnesses, an effective cross-examination of the government's
witnesses, and/or with documents or video, that was consistent with
police perjury. In fairness, however, in all but one of these nine cases,
the evidence that the defendant presented was also consistent with
police negligence or innocent mistake. Eight of these nine perjury
allegations were raised in conjunction with the defendant's motion to
suppress.
In the nine cases in which the defendant produced substantial
evidence of police perjury, the Kansas trial judges ruled for the
defendant twice on the issue of suppression and for the government in
six cases. In both cases in which the trial judge suppressed evidence,
he also specifically found police not credible. In a third case out of the
nine with the strongest evidence of police dishonesty, the judge
completely avoided the credibility determination but ruled for the
144

In Case Number 12, the defendant alleged that he invoked his right to a lawyer
after arrest but that officers violated the invocation by later interrogating him about
the same robberies for which he invoked. The officers gave conflicting testimony at
the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. The judge recognized the conflict
between the officers' testimony but attributed the conflict to one officer's
"misrecollection rather than some effort to hide some coercion."
145 In Case Number 16, there were significant inconsistencies among the officers'
testimony. Ultimately, the trial judge determined that there was evidence of
knowing and intentional omissions from the affidavit submitted in support of a
search warrant.
16 In Case Number 18, the defendant claimed that police lied about the factual basis
for a warrant to search his home. He produced video evidence obtained from the
police department that disputed time and events that police presented in support of
the warrant, including that the defendant was at the police station at 5:34. The
affidavit said that the defendant was at the station at 6:12. The trial judge rejected
the defendant's perjury argument, indicating that the defendant had failed to
establish that the false statement was made intentionally.
147 In Case Number 26, the defendant called two police witnesses to create
inconsistencies in the government's one police witness's testimony. Eventually, the
judge found the police witnesses lacking in credibility.
148In Case Number 27, the defense highlighted numerous inconsistencies in the
testimony of two officers. There were also discrepancies between the officers'
testimony and the dispatch record. The court rejected the argument that the
numerous contradictions and inconsistencies established police perjury.
149 In Case Number 30, a pro se defendant alleged that his case was tainted because it
was investigated by an officer who was later dismissed from the police department
and criminally prosecuted for misconduct. Without holding a hearing, the judge
declared that the defendant had failed to demonstrate misconduct in his particular
case.
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government as a matter of law. Thus, even when the defendant
produced substantial evidence of at least one significant false
statement by police, trial judges in the District of Kansas heavily
favored the government and usually concluded that any false
statements by police resulted from unintentional mistakes.
Accordingly, defendants formally claimed police perjury in
thirty-one cases during the twenty-four months studied. Of these
thirty-one dishonesty arguments, seven (23%) had no chance to
succeed. In those cases, defendants produced little or no evidence to
support their claims. In fifteen of thirty-one cases, (approximately
50%) in which defendants directly or indirectly claimed that police
lied in the investigation or prosecution of their case, the defendant
supported his allegations with at least some evidence and created a
plausible dispute about police credibility. Nevertheless, in each of
these fifteen cases, the defendant's evidence was impeachable for bias
or otherwise. In all but one of these fifteen debatable cases, the trial
judge ruled for the government on the issue of police credibility. In
the one remaining case of fifteen, the judge avoided the credibility
issue but ruled as a matter of law for the defendant, finding that the
government had failed to carry its burden of proof on a disputed
sentencing issue. In the remaining nine cases of thirty-one, defendants
produced a substantial amount of evidence to prove that police made at
least one false statement under oath. The trial judge found police not
credible in only two of nine cases. In one additional case, the judge
avoided the credibility issue.
Strength of Evidence in Support of
Police Dishonesty
. ..
1:Evidence Very Weak or
Nonexistent
* Evidence Competing
Il Evidence Substantial

29%

23%
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What was so persuasive about the defendant's evidence in the
two cases in which judges found police credibility lacking? The trial
judge found police dishonesty in Case Number 16, United States v.
John D. Troxel, and Case Number 26, 1nited States v. Jose
Maldonado. In both, an aggressive cross-examination by defense
counsel15 0 emphasized inconsistencies between and among the
testimony of police officers. In Maldonado, there were inconsistencies
in three officers' in-court testimony and between the officers'
testimony and their written police reports. In Troxel, two officers told
a different story during a hearing than one of the officers had
previously told a state court judge in a sworn affidavit for a search
warrant. In neither case did the defendant testify. In neither did the
defense call civilian witnesses to contradict police. In neither did the
defendant's advocate produce video evidence. Contrary to the type of
independent and corroborative evidence I expected to see (see
Hypotheses, Part II.A.), the evidence that persuaded judges of police
perjury rested with the statements of police themselves. The details of
Cases 16 and 26 follow.
In Case Number 16 (Troxel), the defendant challenged the
veracity of testimony from two police officers, explaining a
warrantless search of the defendant's home.15 1 The defendant also
attacked the truth of statements in an officer's affidavit. Police had
used the affidavit to obtain a search warrant from a state court judge
and to conduct a second, subsequent search of the defendant's
home. 152
First, the federal trial judge found a Fourth Amendment
violation during a search of the defendant's "gun room" within his
mobile home.' 3 According to the judge, while the defendant's wife
gave officers consent to look for her husband in their mobile home,
150The

lawyer in Maldonado was a member of the Federal Public Defender's Office
in Wichita; the defense lawyer in Troxel was a retained attorney.
151Motion to Suppress Evidence and Memorandum
of Law in Support at T 11, 12,
and 13, United States v. Troxel, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Kan. 2008) (No. 0720051-JWL).
152 Id at 21F
(act (2) is incorrect on several accounts.... The Affidavit makes not
[sic] mention of the fact the alleged marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug
paraphernalia were found was [sic] pursuant to a specific search for those substances
and not simply a discovery in plain view. In addition, the alleged marijuana and
methamphetamine had not been determined to be those substances. There is no
indication the items were field tested and it was later determined that the suspected
methamphetamine on the cotton ball was actually cocaine....
1
Troxel, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1241.
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she "did not have authority to consent to the search of the 'gun room,"
and Mr. Troxel could "not possibly have been found inside [a small]
cooler [officers searched]."' 54
The judge also found false statements in the police affidavit
"based on the evidence at the March 17, 2008 hearing." 55 According
to the judge, testimony of the officers during the hearing contradicted
statements in the affidavit. The lead officer on the investigation
testified that he conducted a complete search of defendant's mobile
home for drugs before seeking a search warrant. The affidavit,
however, made the search out to be a cursory, "walk-through"
search. 15 Also, the officer testified that he did not field test residue
that he suspected to be methamphetamine but agreed that his affidavit
said conclusively that the substance was methamphetamine. 15 7
Addressing these inaccuracies, the judge concluded that the
officers' testimony "taken together show that these statements were
knowingly and intentionally made by Sergeant Chambers."
In Case Number 26 (Aaldonado), during an evidentiary
hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, the government called
just one police witness, Officer Cooper of the Wichita (Kansas) Police
Department. With the help of leading questions from the prosecutor,
the officer explained why he had stopped the defendant's pickup truck
during highway travel, testifying about how he acquired the
defendant's consent to search the truck. 158 During that search, police
officers found drugs in the truck's bed wall. 59
Early in the defense's cross-examination of Officer Cooper, the
officer admitted that he and his partner followed the defendant's truck
"[b]ecause it was tagged out of Texas," as opposed to deciding to
investigate the truck because of a traffic violation.1 60 The defense then
began to highlight doubtful details from the officer's testimony. The
defense elicited Officer Cooper's admission that he entered the
highway at mile marker 45 and began following the defendant but that
he did not observe any traffic infraction until marker 46, about 1 mile
54

Id.
Id at 10.
156 Transcript of Motion to Suppress Proceedings at 31, 39, 68, 72, Troxel, 564 F.
Supp. 2d 1235 (No. 07-20051-JWL).
157 Id at 65, 89.
15 Transcript of Motion to Suppress Proceedings at 6, 10, 17-19, United States v.
Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Kan. 2009) (No. 08-10216-01-JTM).
1
15s

159

Id at 23.

160 Id

at 27-28.

304

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF CRILVAL LAW

[Vol. 15:259

later. The officer also acknowledged that the defendant's eventual
traffic infraction was minor-"the only thing that drifted over the
dotted line were the tires on the driver's side."' 6 1 The defense also
elicited that nothing about the defendant's license, registration, the
purchase of his pickup. or any other information raised any suspicion
of the defendant's wrongdoing prior to the consent search.16 2
By the conclusion of the prosecutor's re-direct examination of
Officer Cooper, the judge appeared to doubt the officer's credibility.
Speaking directly to the officer, the judge said: "Officer, I've got to
tell you, I'm a little troubled that you decided to follow him because he
was tagged out of Texas. Now, there are a lot of vehicles that come up
[highway] 135 that have Texas tags or Oklahoma tags, isn't that
accurate?"1 63
In a successful effort to create inconsistencies in the testimony
of the government's only witness, the defense called two other police
witnesses. The first was Officer Cooper's partner, who was with
Officer Cooper in the police cruiser. The second was a sheriff's
deputy who helped search the defendant's pickup. The partner
testified that he saw the defendant's truck drift from its lane only one
time, not two, as Officer Cooper had testified. 164 He also testified that
the lane violation occurred after two miles of observation, not earlier,
as Officer Cooper had said.165 In addition, the partner's written report
contradicted Officer Cooper's testimony about the timing of Officer
Cooper's request to search the defendant's truck.' 6 6 A second defense
police witness highlighted more doubt about Officer Cooper's version
of events. Although Officer Cooper had testified that a sheriffs
deputy just happened on the traffic stop after a drug dog alerted to
defendant's truck, the deputy testified that Officer Cooper told the
deputy to "join [Cooper] at the stop."' 67
Although my insights are necessarily limited to those that
someone can glean from reviewing a written transcript, the deputy's
answers appeared evasive even on paper. For example, when asked
whether a video from his car taken at the time of the stop showed the
161
162
16

Id at 28.

1d at37.
3Id at 44.

164

Id at 48. On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Cooper's partner testified that

he was watching the defendant's pickup truck but only saw it leave its lane once.
16 5
1 d at 48.
66 Id at
52.
67 Id at
7.
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deputy accelerating to the scene, the deputy insisted: "I don't know
where I was going at this time. I have no idea where I was going."16 8
The judge interrupted this questioning, admonishing the deputy
not to talk over the lawyer; however, the deputy continued to avoid
answering questions directly.169 The deputy insisted that he "d[id]n't
know if [he was] heading to [Officer Cooper's] place" at the time on
the video, even though his own police report said that at approximately
the same time, he "was contacted by Officer Cooper to assist him with
a car stop" at "Mile Marker 47."170
The
deputy's
written report,
which
was
made
contemporaneously with this investigation, also contradicted Officer
Cooper's direct examination testimony. Defense counsel elicited
testimony that in the original report, a word had been deleted using
white out.'7 1 Although the deputy testified that he did not know what
word was removed, in context, it appeared that he had removed the
word so that the report did not reflect that three drug-dog searches had
been conducted before drugs were found.172
At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the suppression
hearing, the judge announced orally: "I simply don't believe the
officers in terms of their reasons for pulling him over. I am making a
credibility determination and finding that they are not credible in this
case. . . .

evidence."

1 73

The evidence in this case . . . I am suppressing the

Although the trial judges in Troxel and .aldonado were
persuaded by inconsistencies between and among officers' testimony,
judges in other cases seemed equally unpersuaded by such
contradictions. 74
6

1Id. at 12.

69

Id. at 13. 15.
Id. at 23.
171 Id. at 29-30.
1

170
72

1

Id. at 30.

Id. at 56-57.
In addition to the Maldonadoand Troxel orders, five orders discussed police
inconsistencies. See, e.g., United States v. Tapia, No. 06-20072-JWL, 2007 WL
3487151 (D. Kan. Nov. 13, 2007) (Case Number 2) (defendant called an officer to
testify and elicited errors or inconsistencies in a police report and argued that police
conducted a warrantless search; despite govermient's failure to produce the warrant
at the evidentiary hearing, judge ruled for government); United States v. Donaghue,
No. 07-10022-03, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87023 (D. Kan. Nov. 26, 2007) (Case
Number 4) (during hearing, defendant showed that police possessed several
documents establishing that defendant's address was not the one in the affidavit for a
17

174
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B. The Significance of the Kansas Data
1. What Police Perjury in Kansas Suggests About Police
Perjury Elsewhere
The Federal District of Kansas encompasses the entire state.
The state, in turn, includes a portion of Kansas City, a diverse
metropolitan area of about 450,375 people, six smaller cities, and an
expansive rural area used mostly for farming. In 2008, Kansas had a
population of 2,802,134.'7 About 89% of the Kansas population is
white.17 6 About 50% of residents are female.' 7 7 In 2008, 4 5 % of
registered voters were registered Republicans, with unaffiliated voters
outnumbering Democrats.' 7 8 The Federal District of Kansas includes
ten district court judges and seven magistrate judges. There are three
divisions within the district-Kansas City, Topeka, and Wichita.' 7 9
Located almost exactly in the center of the United States, Kansas
appears similar to many other Midwestern states in terms of
population, demographics, and geography. so
search warrant); United States v. Dixon, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (D. Kan. 2008) (Case
Number 12) (several police officers testified, revealing inconsistencies about
whether the first officer to interview the defendant communicated to the second
interviewer that the defendant had invoked his right to silence); United States v.
Roberts, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Kan. 2008) (Case Number 18) (defendant pointed
to discrepancies in the evidence, such as an affidavit showing that defendant was
present at 6:12 when video showed defendant present at 5:24); United States v.
Johnson, No. 08-40010-01-RDR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43949 (D. Kan. May 22,
2009) (Case Number 30) (there were inconsistencies between the officers' testimony
and the dispatch record).
Kansas QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd'states/20000.html. See also Census Bureau Bumps
Kansas City's Population by 25,455, KAN. Crry Bus. J., Feb. 6, 2009,
http://www.bizjournals.com/'kansascity/stories/2009/02/02/daily63.htmI.
176 Kansas QuickFacts, supra note 175.
77

1

Id.

178See

Palin Gives McCain Extra Boost in Kansas, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2008,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/election2008/2008-09-27-kansaselection N.htm.
179 The Kansas state judicial system includes seven Supreme Court Justices, thirteen
judges on the Court of Appeals, thirty-one judicial districts for one hundred and five
counties, and numerous municipal courts. See Kansas Court System,
http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/ctchart.pdf.
no See, e.g., Iowa QuickFacts from the US Census Bureau,
http://quickfacts.census.goviqfd/states/I 9000.html (indicating that in 2009, Iowa had
an estimated population of three million people: 50% female, 93.9% white, and
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In this seemingly typical Midwestern jurisdiction, criminal
defendants rarely assert in court pleadings or hearings that police have
lied about the investigation of their cases. Extrapolating from the
thirty-one of 584 orders, defendants claimed police perjury in
Eighty-four percent of
approximately 2.24% of all cases.
defendants' perjury allegations were made in the context of motions to
suppress evidence. In particular, defendants usually argued police
perjury in a motion challenging a search or seizure. The majority of
these motions were filed in cases charging the defendant with a drug
crime; about one-third were raised in cases charging the defendant
with a gun crime. Even though defendants were not quick to assert
that police had committed perjury, about 23% of their allegations had
no chance to succeed because the defendant produced no supporting
evidence. Nevertheless, in 68% of the cases in which a defendant
claimed police perjury, the defendant produced evidence creating at
least a debate on the issue. In 29%,. the defendant produced substantial
evidence of at least one false police statement. Some defendants
produced documents that contradicted the police; some called nonpolice witnesses in support of their allegations; others depended on
their lawyers to conduct an aggressive cross-examination of the police
to highlight doubtful and inconsistent police testimony and written
reports. Despite the small number of police peijury allegations and the
varied methods defendants used in attempting to prove their claims,
only two of thirty-one defendants convinced judges in the District of
Kansas to rule that the police had lied to cover up unconstitutional
behaviors and, correspondingly, to apply the exclusionary rule as a
remedy.

about fifty-two people per square mile of land; Nebraska had an estimated 1.8
million people: 50% female, 910%white, and about twenty-two people per square
mile of land; Missouri, which includes part of the metropolitan Kansas City area, had
5.9 million people: 51 % of whom are female, with 85% white population).
181This percentage was derived from averaging the number of cases pending in the
District of Kansas at the beginning of Fiscal Year 2008 and the number of cases
pending at the end of Fiscal Year 2008, which yielded 691 cases. Then, I multiplied
the average number of cases per year (691) by 2 (the number of years for which I
gathered data). That yielded 1,382 cases. I then divided the number of cases for two
years by the number of orders in FY 2008 and 2009 in which defendants claimed
police dishonesty (31). That calculation estimated that defendants allege police lies
in about 2.24% of all cases brought in the District of Kansas.
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Because this study covers only one of ninety-four federal
judicial districts, 182 there is no guarantee that its findings are
representative of judges' rulings nationwide. But Kansas looks similar
to many other Midwestern jurisdictions, and there is no reason to
believe that Kansas is atypical. Thus, ifjudges throughout the United
States are rejecting defendants' allegation of police dishonesty at the
same rate federal judges in Kansas are rejecting them, then judges
across the country are probably fostering police perjury. 8 3 In a typical
fiscal year, U.S. attorneys initiate 63,000 criminal cases in federal
district courts.
Extrapolating from the Kansas findings, in
approximately 1,411 of those cases, a defendant will assert police
dishonesty, and of those 1,411 cases, a judge will find police
dishonesty in only 92 (6.5% of cases). 8 5 Even more problematic for
purposes of reducing police dishonesty, in 29% of cases in which
defendants formally claim police perjury, the balance of the evidence
will favor the defendant's claim. Nevertheless, trial judges will reject
even defendants' strongest proof about 78% of the time. Perhaps even
more troubling, in another 48% of cases, the evidence will be
competing, and credibility could arguably be decided for either the
government or the defendant. In these close cases, if Kansas is typical,
trial judges would decide for the government on the issue of police
credibility 100% of the time.
In other words, if federal district court judges in Kansas are
representative of federal district court judges nationwide, then trial
182

See District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov./districtcourts.html ("There are 94
federal judicial districts, including at least one district in each state, the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico.").
13 There is no reason to think that judicial acceptance of police perjury is not more
pronounced in the state courts, where judges often face intense pressures from reelection campaigns to remain "tough on crime." There is also no reason to believe
that police perjury is not more rampant in big cities, like New York, Los Angeles,
and Chicago, than it is in Kansas City. the biggest city and most urban setting in
Kansas.
184 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL
YEAR 2006 (2006); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED
STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT:
FiSCAt YEAR 2007 (2007); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: EXECIUTIVE OFFICE FOR
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' ANNUAL STATISTICAL

REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008 (2008). This figure was derived from averaging and

then rounding down the fiscal years' data.
185 The 6.5% represents the percentage of orders in which Kansas judges found
police dishonesty when defendants argued the issue. See supra Part I1.B.1.
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judges "habitually accept[] the policeman's word" in the face of
mounting anecdotal and empirical evidence that, not uncommonly,
police commit perjury to circumvent the exclusionary rule.18 6
2. The Supreme Court's Current View of the Exclusionary
Rule Overemphasizes the Cost of Releasing Defendants,
Urging Judges to Err in Favor of Police Credibility
The results of this study suggest at least three possibilities.
First, trial judges in the District of Kansas may consciously or
subconsciously embrace Judge Cardozo's view that the criminal
should not go free when the constable blunders, a view seemingly also
favored by a majority of the current Supreme Court. Second, the
Kansas trial judges may be clumsy at identifying police perjury. 187
Third, the judges may be effectively identifying police dishonesty in
all cases in which it occurs. Although a plausible argument can be
offered for each alternative, the third possibility seems at least
somewhat less likely than the first two. Given the diversity of prior
studies and other anecdotal evidence suggesting that police are prone
to lie to avoid the exclusionary rule, as well as the fact that most
perjury allegations in this study were raised in the suppression context,
alternatives one and two appear more probable than alternative three,
even before the specific results of the Kansas study are tallied.
Moreover, considering the Kansas study, in approximately 87% of
cases in which the evidence seemed balanced or stronger in support of
a finding that police may have committed perjury, judges,
nevertheless, found officers credible. Twenty-one of twenty-four of
these rulings were issued in the context of deciding a defendant's
motion to suppress evidence. Thus, in about 90% of the cases with
equal or more evidence of police perjury, trial judges in Kansas
refused to apply the exclusionary rule. At least circumstantially,
judges' denial of so many motions to suppress in cases with competing
and substantial evidence of police perjury demonstrates a greater
18 See Wilson, supra note 17 (cataloguing evidence of police lies during criminal

investigations).
187 See Maureen O'Sullivan, Mark G. Frank, Carolyn M. Hurley & Jaspreet Tiwana,
Police Lie Detection Accuracy: The Effect of Lie Scenario, 33 LAw & Hum. BEHAV.
530 (2008) (most people "are not better than chance in detecting deception"); Olin
Guy Wellborn, III, Demeanor, 76 CORNEtL L. REV. 1075 (1991) ("According to the
empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot make effective use of demeanor in
deciding whether to believe a witness.").
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tolerance for potential police perjury than for release of seemingly
guilty defendants.
There are countless reasons for any one judge to favor the
government when a defendant alleges that the police lied about the
investigation of his case, even in situations where we could control for
the quality and amount of evidence. As discussed previously, a judge
may worry about appearing soft on crime. She may be familiar with
an officer from prior cases and be reluctant to call that officer a liar.' 8 8
Many judges are appointed to the bench after serving as prosecutors,
potentially creating pro-government bias from the outset. But all of
these tendencies to favor the government could be reduced by a strong
Supreme Court standard denouncing police perjury in suppression
matters. Rather than denounce police perjury, the majority's current
conception of the exclusionary rule neglects the problem and naturally,
even if unwittingly, leads trial judges to tend to favor police testimony
in both close and doubtful cases.
The Supreme Court's current interpretation of the exclusionary
rule leads trial judges to undervalue the costs of police lies in all but
those cases exhibiting the most flagrant police perjury and misconduct.
In recent decisions, including Herring, a majority of justices
announced a legally-mandated preference for preserving evidence of a
defendant's guilt rather than protecting other values of the justice
system, such as judicial and justice system integrity. For example, in
Herring,Justice Roberts criticized Justice Ginsburg for envisioning an
exclusionary rule that would further goals other than deterrence of
unconstitutional police conduct, writing: "Justice Ginsburg's dissent
champions what she describes as '"a more majestic conception' of ...
the exclusionary rule,"

. . .

which would exclude evidence even where

deterrence does not justify doing so. Majestic or not, our cases reject
this conception."'8 9 Because a majority of the Court stresses the risk
of letting the guilty escape punishment without accounting for cases
(like those involving police perjury), which impose extensive costs on
the justice system, the Court's current interpretation of the
exclusionary rule naturally urges trial judges to forgive questionable
police testimony in an eagerness to protect evidence of the defendant's
guilt.
"" These pressures may be greatest for state court judges who are typically elected,
but federal judges may also respond to these influences, consciously or
subconsciously.
189 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 n.2 (2009).
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As Justice Ginsburg indicated in her dissent in Herring, the
most serious impact of the majority's insistence on an exclusionary
rule that weighs only the benefits of deterrence against the cost of
allowing a uilty defendant to escape prosecution will "be on innocent
persons."19 In Herring, Justice Ginsburg was concerned about the
arrest of persons on the basis of erroneous information from police
databases.
Justice Ginsburg's concern about the harassment of
innocent citizens validly extends to the search context. In a typical
case, police may stop and search people traveling in public areas
without probable cause. Provided the citizen is innocent and possesses
no contraband, her case never reaches criminal court. 191 Even in cases
in which the police stop a person without legal reason but lie to create
probable cause after finding contraband, the majority's anemic
exclusionary rule, which is rarely imposed, will undermine the
public's faith in the integrity of police. To the extent the public
becomes aware of such unlawful conduct, citizens will doubt the
police in future cases and presumably become less cooperative in
police investigations. Moreover, to the extent judges seem to ignore
such police behaviors, judges become part of a corrupt process, casting
doubt on the entire law enforcement system.
The influence of the Supreme Court's current conception of the
exclusionary rule on trial judges' fact-finding missions to decide
credibility is more obvious in context. When a defendant moves to
suppress evidence, claiming that police violated his constitutional
rights and are now lying to cover up that misconduct, a trial judge has
four choices: 1) decide for the defendant on credibility-finding that
police gave perjured testimony to cover up unconstitutional behavior;
2) decide for the government on credibility-finding that police
truthfully explained that they uncovered evidence of defendant's guilt
through constitutional means; 3) presume or find as a factual matter
that police lied, but rule that any such lie is legally irrelevant; or 4)
rule for the government because of a lack of proof.
When trial judges view evidence of criminal activity through
the lens of the majority's two-goal exclusionary rule, option 1 seems
destined for rejection in favor of options two, three or four, except in
cases with obvious police lies or patently offensive police misconduct.
Especially in cases with competing evidence for and against police
at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
'9' An innocent person is unlawfully stopped and harassed and has no practical
recourse for the invasion of privacy and liberty.
190Id
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credibility, and even in cases with significant evidence of at least one
or two false statements, the need for deterrence will seem weak when
viewed with the benefit of hindsight, knowing that police uncovered a
crime and a probable criminal. Thus, trial judges are naturally inclined
to deny motions to suppress, even in cases exhibiting some evidence of
police perjury. Of course, if a defendant produces particularly
persuasive evidence that police have lied in an attempt to win a
conviction, the trial judge may experience serious doubts about both
police testimony and the defendant's guilt. In those cases with
significant evidence of police dishonesty, the need for deterrence will
appear more compelling. Those are the cases (like Case Numbers 16
and 26 in my study) with the best chance for suppression of evidence.
Option One: When confronted with a defendant's claim that an
officer violated his constitutional rights and then lied about the
misconduct, the trial judge's first option is to find that the defendant
established police perjury to conceal unconstitutional behavior and to
grant the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Assuming that a
judge rules in this way, there are two possibilities. One, the judge
could be correct. The police violated the defendant's constitutional
rights and lied to make it appear that the evidence of defendant's guilt
was obtained legally. Two, the judge may have ruled incorrectly.
Although some evidence indicated that the police lied, in actuality, the
police told the truth. Perhaps, the story was a bit convoluted, and one
officer became confused under cross-examination, thus creating the
appearance of dishonesty even though the officers had obtained the
evidence in compliance with the defendant's constitutional rights.
Applying the Supreme Court majority's view of the
exclusionary rule, the second outcome is a travesty of justice.
Deterrence is not served because there is no police misconduct to
deter, and the resulting ruling undermines "basic concepts of the
criminal justice system," including "truth-seeking and law
enforcement objectives" because a guilty defendant will (probably) be
released. But notice, the first ruling is not much better. Yes, the
police lied, which is less than ideal. But the exclusionary rule is not
concerned with the potential loss of popular trust in the government or
possible taint the judiciary may suffer from ignoring police lies.
Moreover, while imposition of the exclusionary rule in this case might
deter some officers from telling lies, as discussed in the introduction to
this paper, others would learn to lie more convincingly. Thus, the cost
of releasing a guilty defendant is substantial and arguably greater than
the likelihood or importance of deterring future police misconduct of

2010]1

IMPROBABLE CAUSE

313

this kind.
In fact, under the majority's two-competing-value
conception, the cost of imposing the rule in most cases is too great.
When there are only two competing interests, deterrence and release of
a guilty and dangerous defendant, deterrence will seldom win.
Option Two: In terms of incentives to find for the government,
the trial judge's second option looks exactly like the first. As long as
the judge can plausibly find that police testified credibly, she can deny
the defendant's motion to suppress. As in the first case, there is no
need for deterrence because under this scenario, the police told a
believable story and accurately identified the guilty criminal. Denying
the motion to suppress will ensure that a guilty defendant faces trial for
his illegal conduct.
Thus, again the benefits of denying the
defendant's motion to suppress prevail over the costs.
Option Three: If the evidence of police dishonesty seems
persuasive, a trial judge may find that police lack credibility or at least
assume, without deciding, that defendant's contention is true. But
even then, if the focus is on deterrence and guilt, there may be no
incentive to exclude evidence. In addition to its disfavor of the
exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has established that the presence
of police perjury in a case does not necessarily taint the whole case, an
entire police affidavit, or even require suppression of a particular piece
of evidence. As a result, a trial judge who assumes or finds police
perjury is not duty bound to suppress evidence. As the Court held in
Franks,192 a trial judge is permitted to set aside a portion of testimony
tainted by police perjury and determine (as if there were no perjury)
how the case should be decided once the tainted portion is removed
from consideration.
For example, if an officer lies about the
information he received from a cooperating witness to pad an affidavit
in support of a search warrant, the warrant obtained with the perjury is
not necessarily invalid. If the trial judge finds in hindsight that the
affidavit was sufficient to create probable cause, although weak
without the perjury, the trial judge must deny the defendant's motion
to suppress. Furthermore, given that a case will not reach court unless
the affidavit, weak or not, is redeemed by the evidence of guilt officers
found using it, once again the tendency will be for judges to find
police perjury irrelevant even when police perjury appears to exist.

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (only false statements in an affidavit
that are necessary to the Magistrate Judge's probable-cause determination matter;
other false statements, even if intentional, are irrelevant).
192
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Option Four: Finally, a judge can find a lack of proof of police
perjury. For the reasons expressed in options one through three,
judges' tendencies will be to deny a defendant's motion in all but the
most obvious cases. Unless there is extensive evidence of patent
police lies (the strongest case for deterrence), there is little reason to
deter police from other successful investigations of this kind.
In sum, in a legal system that values the exclusionary rule only
as a tool for deterrence, trial judges who faithfully apply the Supreme
Court's precedent will disfavor suppression in all four scenarios.
Now, consider the trial judge's same options from the perspective of a
system that embraces a more majestic conception of the exclusionary
rule, a system in which, when deciding motions to suppress, a judge
should consider his own integrity and the appearance that he is
encouraging perjury. The outcome in cases with debatable and
significant evidence of police dishonesty would often resolve
differently. Judges would be more likely to suppress evidence if
denying such motions meant that judges were personally approving of
police tactics and testimony. From this perspective, "[a] rule admitting
evidence in a criminal trial . . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing

the conduct which produced the evidence . . . .
Therefore, trial
judges would apply the exclusionary rule to deter unwanted police
misconduct and to maintain the citizens' respect for a fair and
impartial process by protecting the process from contamination of
likely police illegality and perjury. 194
Adoption of the Ginsburg-Stevens more majestic exclusionary
rule would encourage the government to present consistent and
convincing testimony from police during suppression hearings and,
where possible, to corroborate that testimony with video evidence,
documents, and eyewitness testimony. Judges would be more cautious
about accepting evidence in cases with conflicting police testimony
and in cases in which the defendant introduced other persuasive
evidence that police may have lied to cover up unconstitutional
behaviors. A standard emphasizing the importance of judicial and
system integrity might also influence those judges who are inept at
evaluating police credibility by encouraging them in close cases to
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
US. 1, 13 (1968)).
194 Id (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Yale Kamisar, Does (Did)
(Should) The
Exclusionary Rule Rest On A "PrincipledBasis" Rather than An "Empirical
Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 600 (1983)).
193
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consider how the public would perceive the probabilities of the police
testimony. This increased judicial scrutiny of police would ultimately
better protect citizens' constitutional rights, promote popular trust in
government generally, and assist all of the honest, hard-working police
who benefit from gaining the trust of the citizens they serve. At least
in cases of potential police perjury, the Ginsburg-Stevens conception
of the exclusionary rule recognizes that the cost of releasing any one
guilty defendant may not be as costly as allowing police to avoid
application of the exclusionary rule by lying about their own conduct.
CONCLUSION
Several prior studies have demonstrated that police sometimes,
if not often, lie in an attempt to avoid the effects of the exclusionary
rule. This study of federal trial judges in the District of Kansas
suggests that judges may be fostering this police perjury. Judges may
unwittingly encourage police perjury because they subconsciously
recognize that acknowledging perjury will probably result in release of
a culpable defendant. Judges may also permit perjury because they
cannot determine when police are lying. In either case, the Supreme
Court majority's conception of the exclusionary rule naturally leads
trial judges to deny defendants' motions to suppress. When trial
judges consider police deterrence as the sole reason to invoke the
exclusionary rule, judges necessarily consider the police's success in
uncovering evidence of the defendant's guilt, a desirable, not
deterrent-worthy result. To awaken trial judges' vigilance about police
dishonesty, which corrupts a reliable justice system by obtaining the
admission of tainted evidence, this article argues for the GinsburgStevens more majestic conception of the exclusionary rule. Such a
conception does not require a change in the law but, rather, a return to
the Supreme Court's earlier precedent, explaining that although
deterrence of police misconduct is an important and primary goal of
the exclusionary rule, the rule also serves to protect justice system
integrity.
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